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ABSTRACT 
Modernity in Miniature: Maoism and the Beijing Department Store 
Samuel M. Hellmann 
Advisor: Susan Buck-Morss 
This thesis examines the Beijing Department Store as a contradictory structure embedded in the 
world’s largest Communist revolution. By looking at the urban planning decisions behind 
constructing a colonial form in the center of the socialist capital, I attempt to unravel the 
complex intersection of economic development and egalitarian mass action in the early Maoist 
period. Constructed in 1955 during the first Five Year Plan, the Department Store sheds light on 
the specific parameters of post-revolution modernization campaigns. Furthermore, by looking at 
the conceptualizations of the building by the Party, architects, and the workers inside the store, I 
examine how the Department Store responded to global circumstances and a historical, 
transnational conjuncture facing other Communist projects like the Soviet Union. By turning to 
the philosophy of Walter Benjamin and Cai Xiang, I attempt to elaborate the Department Store 
as a “dialectical image,” a real physical space that crystalizes competing temporalities and social 
relations at a momentary standstill. Applying this analytic to the Department Store reveals the 
way it balanced notions of egalitarianism and modernism, as well as competing potentials for the 
commodity form under a socialist economy. By looking at how this single structure manifested 
these tensions, I argue that architecture and urban design represent more than a superstructural 
manifestation of an economic base, but rather are a centrally constitutive part of society, both 
economically and politically, and thus show the larger contradictions at play in the Maoist 
project. Finally, in revealing these tensions, I show how the Beijing Department Store contained 
real potentials for rethinking repressive social relationships and how the covering up of these 
potentials forms the foundation of the contemporary Chinese state, whose urban space is defined 
more and more by malls and department stores.  
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1 
PROLOGUE: A MODEST METHODOLOGICAL PROPOSAL 
I prefer to think that socialism is not the end of the revolution; on the contrary, it births a new revolution. 
-Cai Xiang
This thesis was written in the converted halls of the B. Altman Department Store on Fifth 
Avenue in Manhattan. Despite its continued location at the heart of New York’s shopping 
district, the building now presents itself as a totally different structure: the CUNY Graduate 
Center, a state-owned institution of higher learning. But the physical appearance of the building 
as well as its interior segmentation into different “departments,” such as my own (political 
science), reminds us that the residues of past historical and political conjunctures remain as 
physical facts of the urban environment, facts that articulate both the economic functioning of 
our current society and our ability to understand it. Perhaps politics and the department store are 
not distinct enterprises. 
Nowhere is this connectedness more apparent than in the Beijing Department Store in the 
Wangfujing district of downtown Beijing. Constructed in 1955, at the beginning of the 
Communist experiment, the Department Store represented many functions. As a distribution 
node in the first Five Year Plan, the Department Store sought to coordinate production and 
consumption in a modernizing planned economy. As a site of consumer commodities, the 
Department Store sought to present a level of abundance not available in the previous years of 
Japanese invasion and Nationalist rule. But most importantly, as a directly political site at the 
administrative center of a Communist revolution, the Department Store sought to engage the 
public in crafting new egalitarian social relationships in the present. Inside the Department Store, 




Thus, the Beijing Department Store materialized competing notions and practices of nationalism, 
internationalism, modernism, and socialism within a city and a country undergoing the world’s 
largest ever revolution. Now, when that same Department Store and its holding company (one of 
the largest mall operators in China) have become the focal point of a new vision for China, one 
defined by the consumption of international commodities by an officially defined Beijing 
citizen—and the repressive working conditions of all those who fall outside that category—
understanding the structure is more important than ever.1 In a world where Chinese production 
holds up western consumption, something concretely economic connects the Graduate Center to 
the Beijing Department Store. But, as this thesis will argue, something political does too. That is, 
both these structures obscure past, alternative formulations of the commodity and the role of the 
collective in shaping politics, an obfuscation essential for the hegemony of our current political 
moment. Thus, understanding the connectedness of these two structures both historically and 
presently is the key to not only understanding our current catastrophe, but also to understanding a 
better world that almost was. 
 
The method used by this thesis to understand these connections and hidden significances is 
borrowed from the German philosopher, Walter Benjamin, who I argue recognized not only the 
methodological potential of capturing images as “dialectics at a standstill,” but who also realized 
that those captured images are spatial, referring to real, material places in the world. The spatial 
analysis that Benjamin constructed referenced multiple temporalities (multiple historical 
 
1 For some figures on the Beijing Department Store’s holding company see “China Focus: Beijing's Department 
Stores Speed Up Retail Transition,” Xinhua, December 9, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-
12/09/c_138618020.htm; for an analysis of the Beijing registration system see Wang Hui, “Two Kinds of New Poor 
and Their Future,” East-Asian Marxisms and Their Trajectories, eds. Joyce C.H. Liu, Viren Murthy, trans Saul 




moments and their attendant narrations of time), but it did not arrange them linearly. Indeed, our 
notion of temporality is so fraught and inextricably linear that if I were to argue that our current 
capitalist moment arranges time temporally, the image called up to our minds is not immediately 
a tautology: we no doubt conjure an image of epochs on a timeline aligning themselves neatly to 
form a beginning and an end. However, in what follows, I will draw attention to how, in 1955, 
the Beijing Department Store, with its socialist newness that yet still somehow embodied a very 
capitalistic function and modernist teleology, belied this arrangement. To escape this trap, and 
thus to adequately account for structures like department store and their hidden socialist history, 
I argue for what I see in Benjamin’s work as a novel move in critical theory: the arrangement of 
time spatially.  
 
The arrangement of time spatially is concretely reflected in the urban spaces we inhabit. 
Benjamin took the example of his environment of twentieth century Paris, wherein different 
epochs of architecture existed simultaneously at a standstill, a collage of temporalities (e.g. 
Gothic, Modern, Classical, etc.), a fact also true for Beijing. Immediately, however, this presents 
a problem for the standard Marxist analysis whereby a given historical moment is defined by its 
embeddedness within a totality—a contingent totality engendered by a particular mode of 
production at that point in history. The image of Paris as a collage of temporalities, however, 
presents residues from a plurality of productive modes. Benjamin answered this contradiction by 
first acknowledging the Marxist insight: he asserted that the temporal residues occupying a given 
space are fundamentally altered by the productive and political arrangements that they currently 
inhabit. But, this alteration is not wholly reducible to the Marxist analytic. The nature of this re-




production shattered the wish symbols of the previous century, even before the monuments 
representing them had collapsed.”2 Thus, the category of the “wish symbol” or “wish image” is 
the important mediating link to envision the relation between productive forces and relations of 
production within a spatial arrangement of time. 
 
This conception of spatial time represents a guiding framework throughout this thesis. I draw on 
it implicitly both in my attempt to situate Beijing Department Store in history and to understand 
the applicability of Benjamin’s work in understanding it. Here, I would like to briefly unpack it 
more explicitly through the use of an image. On the one hand, reading time spatially is merely an 
alternative to linear-ality (one that is perhaps intuitive, see for instance this image by Benjamin 
in “On the Concept of History:” “[d]oesn’t a breath of air that pervaded earlier days caress us as 
well?”).3 That is, if we are looking for an analytic to replace a notion of politics qua progress 
through time, rooting our notion of politics in space has the benefit of starting from the everyday 
experience of physical space, specifically the space of the city. This is a concrete, and most 
importantly, shared experience amongst the collective. On the other hand, by starting from this 
shared experience, we quickly see that rooting politics in space not only allows us to escape the 
constricting discourse of progress, but it also provides a vantage point for seeing how that 
discourse functions and what social relations perpetuate it. Time is produced though spaces: no 
doubt, an architectural style retroactively designates a landscape as part of an epoch, and certain 
spatial forms being built today are meant to remind us that we are indeed in the cutting edge of 
capitalist modernity (think of big architectural projects in New York like the Hudson Yards or 
 
2 Walter Benjamin, “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century [Exposé of 1935]” The Arcades Project, trans. Howard 
Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999), 13. 
3 Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings Vol 4: 1938-1940, eds. 




Zaha Hadid’s Wangjing Soho Mall in Beijing with their relentless assertion of technological 
sophisticated-ness, see Image 2). Now, imagine an American visiting Beijing today. She no 
doubt relates the old architecture (not present in an American city) to previous modes of 
production (likely some image of dynastic rule). But the modern commodities circulating 
through it as well as the skyscrapers in the distance give this American viewer a sense of the 
passage of time, a passage wrought with contradictions. Standing in Tiananmen Square reminds 
her of the revolutionary potential immanent in the time of the Cultural Revolution as well as the 
lack of that potential now (in a Tiananmen filled with tourists and commodities advertising a 
nationalist China). But at the same time, these commodities instill a dissatisfaction with the 
present order of things, and the space of the commune presents a flash for thinking of a 
revolutionary moment now. And, just outside the next ring road, workers protest conditions 
inside factories producing for American markets. If time is produced and reflected through 
spaces, looking at those spaces in a constellation means putting those temporal means of 
production and their contestation from the masses in context with each other for a bigger yet 
nonlinear picture. Benjamin’s project of arranging time spatially means the critical project of 
explaining changes in history through these spatial constellations as well as the constructive 
project of producing the images that make thinking this way possible.  
 
According to Benjamin, when the means of production undergo changes, those changes are 
governed by the form of the modes previous to them. But alongside these new means of 
production emerge (or “correspond”) “images in the collective consciousness,” which similarly 






These images are “wish images.” They are such because the past referenced by the collective 
consciousness is not the past of repressive social relations but according to the Benjamin scholar, 
Michael Jennings, the interstices of history, moments of classlessness hidden by bourgeois linear 
temporality, which ascribes to capitalism an unbreakable causal chain and thereby relegates 
previous emancipatory flashes to meaninglessness and obscurity.5 These glimpses of the primal 
past are called up specifically by the collective to make sense of the possibilities of new means 
of production and to harmonize social relations with those possibilities in an egalitarian way. 
Large construction projects, then, are the efforts by class actors to either solidify these wish 
images in a physical arrangement or to deracinate their transcendent character and convert them 
into ideology that can perpetuate given social relations.  
 
In the following chapters I contend with these construction projects by way of the Beijing 
Department Store. Looking at both the specific actions of Party elites as well as individuals 
inside the Department Store, I articulate the building’s contradictions as both the product of a 
specifically Maoist project and also as a foundational Communist conjuncture that equally 
occurred in Russia. Following a modernization scheme borrowed from the Soviet Union, the 
Department Store represented the Party’s attempt to coordinate production and consumption all 
while providing a level of abundance to the socialist public. In so doing, it engendered modes of 
urban everyday life at odds with the Party’s explicit focus on the rural peasant. But this 
contradiction was not just the result of Party ideology. The wariness directed at this urban 
lifeworld represented a global conjuncture and a keen awareness of the threat posed by the 
proliferation of commodities in a new socialist society. Looking at practices in the Department 
 




Store (specifically the way production, selling, and consumption were carried out under new 
patterns based on an attempted proletarian reciprocity rather than profit maximization) shows the 
specific contours of the Party’s and the socialist collective’s theorization of this threat and the 
way the responsibility for it was ultimately lodged at individuals rather than the social 
relationships and spatial arrangements that modernization had inspired. In leveling this threat at 
the individual, the Maoist project rendered the emancipatory potential of objects invisible. 
Focusing on the physical structure of the Department Store as the outcome of contradictory 
spatial politics while examining practices inside it as the responses to those contradictions allows 
us to better understand the totality of the Maoist project as well as to pick up the lost fragments 

























Image 1: Red Guard Demonstration in Tiananmen ~1966, “Shidai de Fengkuang: Tushuo Wenge Shiqi de Hong 
Weibing Yundong” 时代的疯狂：图说文革时期的红卫兵运动 [Madness of the Times: Pictures of Cultural 
Revolution Red Guard Movements], eFree News, last updated June 19 2019, 
http://chinese.efreenews.com/a/shidaidifengjue-tutuowenjishijidihongweibingyundong; and Tiananmen sprinkler 



















Image 2: Beijing Department Store today and Zaha Hadid’s Wangjing Soho Mall. “Beijing Department Store,” 
Beijing Tourism, July 5, 2017, http://english.visitbeijing.com.cn/a1/a-XCWTN6F04FD7883E577356; “Wangjing 






CHAPTER ONE: THE DEPARTMENT STORE 
Economic law unavoidably governs our acts and our thoughts…Industry on a grand scale must  
occupy itself with building…We must create the mass production spirit.  




Throughout China, malls and department stores are symbols of the new. In the country’s 
megacities, malls are everywhere, and through their post-modern exterior design and gaudy 
advertising screens, they act as potent signifiers of a new political and economic reality. But, 
some residue of the old seeps out from the edges of these structures. From the food courts 
designed to look like back alley vendors, to the bookstores designed to look like pre-Communist 
tea houses, the modern department store seeks to encode some particular notion of post-
socialism’s pre-history. This encoding at once bumps up against the urban collective’s own 
image of history. From the elderly groups dancing in unison in the plazas to the big character 
banners draping the facades, a specter of Maoism haunts the department store.  
 
The compounding temporalities visible at the margins of these structures gesture to the 
fragments of a contradiction central to the existence of the city in China. Despite the newness 
projected by these malls, they are not new. In many cases, the shop floors that now house Louis 




The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the subsequent liberalization of the Chinese economy in 




store. Indeed, any tourist to China will likely be struck by the ubiquity of shopping malls and 
department stores. With the movement of Chinese commerce out of physical buildings and into 
online spaces, the structure of the mall lingers in physical space as a residue of an older time. But 
the social role of this residue is far from settled. Its occupation of valuable real estate in the 
center of Chinese cities still makes it a congregating point for crowds and a focal point of the 
urban environment. And despite the wane in department store sales, new ones are still being 
built. Indeed, the early 2000s saw the construction of massive malls by big-name western 
architects. Perhaps the most emblematic is Zaha Hadid’s Galaxy SoHo mall in Beijing (Image 
1.1). Opened in 2014, this work by the famous Iraqi-British architect showcases her idiosyncratic 
parametric design through four large towers meant to imitate features deemed quintessentially 
“Chinese.”6 In many ways, Galaxy Soho is a monument to China’s new post-socialist order. It 
intricately balances the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) projected place in society through its 
monumentality, global neoliberalism through its prefabrication and explicit politics (the head of 
Hadid’s firm argues for the privatization of all public lands), and a rising nationalism through its 
feigned fealty to some traditional Chinese design.7 Thus, the mall is an intervention in space by 
the party, meant to solidify a new economic vision within the urban environment.8 By capturing 
all the possibilities of the post-Mao moment and manipulating them into a singular repressive 
vision (the Party’s notion of bureaucratic capitalist accumulation), the mall, as a real material 
object, thus translates a top-down vision of social relations into the urban environment and 
everyday life. 
 
6 “Galaxy Soho,” Zaha Hadid Architects (official website), accessed April 1, 2020, https://www.zaha-
hadid.com/architecture/galaxy-soho/. 
7 Patrik Schumacher, “Parametric Patterns,” Architectural Design 79 (November/December 2009). 















Image 1.1: “Galaxy Soho,” Zaha Hadid Architects, https://www.zaha-hadid.com/architecture/galaxy-soho/. 
 
But these malls and department stores are not just straightforward political projects. Their ability 
to articulate urban space is mediated by history and the commodity form. This history is not 
abstract; it exists as physical structures within the same landscape. Just down the street from 
Galaxy Soho, the Soviet-style Beijing Department Store equally attracts crowds. Despite its 
refurbished exterior and thoroughly modern shop floor (housing many of the same brands as 
Galaxy Soho), the Beijing Department Store stands out as a remnant from an older urban 
intervention. From the current moment, this intervention is hazy. The eclectic mix of antique 
displays, beaux-arts trim, and monuments to model workers renders the original telos of the 
Department Store only in fragments. Nonetheless, its position in the same urban space as Galaxy 
Soho reveals that the project of translating large-scale economic imperatives to physical space 
has a long history, and that the specific use of the department store marks Chinese modernity 




occupants of the Beijing Department Store also remain unchanged: the worker, the consumer, 
and the commodity. Tracing the department store through time thus highlights the commodity’s 
contemporary role in congealing collective desires into the repressive relations of post-socialist 
China while also revealing the transience and fragility of this articulation—revealing alongside it 
previous formulations and lost revolutionary potentials. 
 
Forms of the Chinese Environment 
Within the department store, the post-socialist drive for complete integration into the global 
capitalist market finds a point of intersection with the everyday life of the Chinese public. Thus, 
the department store, which has exploded across the Chinese urban landscape, seems synecdoche 
for a new era in People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, the department store is not new in 
the PRC. While the recent proliferation of department stores is certainly a reflection of the 
massive reordering of Chinese society towards consumer capitalism, it is not the first time this 
peculiar structure has acted as the harbinger of new social relations. Dating back to the rule of 
the nationalist Guomindang in the 1920s, department stores have been a palpable residue of 
modernization campaigns and a signifier of modernity in urban space.  
 
Echoing the historian, Paul Rabinow, we could view the department store as a “form,” a set 
design in the physical environment meant to condition a certain type of behavior in order to 
regulate a society newly defined by urbanization.9  Indeed, the concept “department store” 
existed in China before the actual construction of any given department store. As Rabinow 
observes in his investigation of French architectural practices in Morocco, the metropole 
 
9 Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Chicago: University of Chicago 




engenders these forms through a historical process of knowledge construction and then applies 
them as ready-made entities onto the landscape of the colonies. Technocrats in the metropole 
assumes that the same norms that define a healthy society in France are universal, and thus the 
forms to produce them are transposable.10 The department store is not an indigenous Chinese 
structure. It exists in the Chinese landscape through the historical fact of imperialism. Tracing 
the origin of the department store in China shows clear parallels to Rabinow’s study; the first 
instances of consumer-capitalist relations in China, and indeed department stores, come from the 
French concession in Shanghai.  
 
Conceptualizing the department store as a colonial import as well as a potent tool of capitalist 
modernization offers a useful point of critique. But limiting an analysis of modernity to 
specifically colonial or capitalist moments leaves a glaring lacuna: the Maoist period. Indeed, 
looking at the consumerism of Nationalist Guomindang (GMD) rule as the direct prehistory of 
post-Mao capitalist accumulation plays into an insidious trend in the historiography of China that 
connects the nationalist government and the current pro-capitalist regime in order to justify the 
current marketization as the realization of a true Chinese character with origins deeper and older 
than the rise to prominence of a reformist wing in the party after Mao’s death—the result being 
the relegation of the Maoist experiment (and revolution more broadly) to the status of aberration, 
or else senseless “years of turmoil” (as per the official party interpretation of the Cultural 
Revolution).11 Most importantly for the current investigation, however, is the fact that this 
 
10 Ibid., ch. 9. 
11 Yiching Wu, The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2014), 7; Also see Rebecca E. Karl, The Magic of Concepts: History and the Economic in 
Twentieth-Century China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017) for a critique of historical trends relating GMD 




relegation obscures a surprising fact: the widespread construction of department stores by the 
Maoist government. Furthermore, the analysis of department stores as merely an abstract object 
of colonial knowledge leaves us bereft of tools for understanding the significance of the 











Image 1.2: Beijing Department Store Exterior in 1955, photograph by Wang Zhiyuan, from “Beijing’s Newly 
Constructed Department Store,” People’s Daily. 
 
In 1955, just two years into the first Five Year Plan, the Maoist state emphatically staked its 
vision for the urban environment of Beijing with the construction of the Beijing Department 
Store (originally, Beijing City Department Store and Wangfujing General Store, Beijing Shi 
Baihuogongsi Wangfujing Baihuoshangdian) in the central district of Wangfujing (Image 1.2), 
designed by the architect, Yang Tingbao. Standing six stories tall, the structure departed from 




Kong. Unlike similar structures in those areas, Yang’s design conformed to the Soviet style of 
the time: squared, utilitarian, and concrete. Indeed, the building is not dissimilar in style from 
many of the government buildings in Beijing (many of which Yang and his students designed). 
Similarly, the Beijing Department Store claimed to embody relations different than the colonial-
capitalist department stores of pre-revolution China. Half of the department store was dedicated 
to the manufacturing of commodities, and workers on both the retail side and the manufacturing 
side were equally considered proletarian workers.12 This latter point is best illustrated by Zhang 
Binggui, a famous sales clerk and model worker inside the Beijing Department Store. Zhang’s 
image not only came to symbolize both the logics of the Department Store and correct 
proletarian consumerism more broadly, but furthermore his image underwent a reevaluation after 
Mao’s death, eventually leading to his enshrinement in a statue outside the Department Store 
(Image 1.3), a statue which valiantly proclaims the spirit of consumption and enterprise in post-
socialist China. Zhang will be a major component of this thesis, specifically in chapter three, but 
for now, a retrospective he wrote in 1977, at the crossroads between the Maoist period and the 
looming liberalization of the 1980s, is particularly illuminating in its attempt to re-excavate the 
early hopes of the Department Store in 1955. In it, Zhang argued that the Department Store was a 
laboratory for constructing new socialist relations of production, distribution, and consumption. 
This very project was indeed contradictory and unclear. In trying to resolve these contradictions 
in his everyday practices, Zhang relied on the following instruction from his CCP superior: 
“socialist business and capitalist business have a fundamentally different essence. Capitalist 
 
12 “Beijing Shi Xinjian Baihuo Dalou Jinri Kaimu” 北京市新建百货大楼今日开幕 [Beijing’s Newly Constructed 




business seeks above all to accumulate money, while socialist business wants first and foremost 

















Image 1.3: Statue of Zhang Binggui at the Entrance to the Beijing Department Store, Zhang Jingshu and Li Muyi, 
“The Most Beautiful Revolutionary, Salesperson Zhang Binggui,” Beijing News, October 3, 2019, 
http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2019/10/03/632393.html. 
 
Despite the obvious propaganda value of Zhang’s assessment, the liminal period in which it was 
written (i.e. not the same period as the Department Store’s initial construction and also prior to 
the period of capitalist accumulation that saw the construction of new department stores) tells us 
that we should not be so quick to dismiss its optimism as the byproduct of a top-down narrative. 
Indeed, this attempt to use the form of capitalist consumption for the goal of new egalitarian 
social relations ties into real debates on the nature of the commodity form under socialism that 
played out over the length of the Maoist period as well as in other Communist projects. Speaking 
specifically of the Chinese case, the historian, Laurence Coderre, explains how early 
 
13 Zhang Binggui 张秉贵, “Wei Geming Zhan Guitai” 为革命站柜台 [Sell for the Revolution], Hongqi 红旗 [Red 




theorizations of the commodity in Communist China accepted its enduring existence under new 
forces of production but argued that new relations of production had the potential to rearticulate 
the commodity’s content and the way it functioned in society. Taken from Karl Marx’s Capital, 
the CCP’s understanding of capitalist commodities centered on their tendency to displace 
relationships between people with relationships between things, elevating the circulation of 
objects to the status of ultimate social determiner. The goal was thus posed as “transplanting 
commodities out of their ‘native’ capitalist soil and into a more ‘advanced’ stage of historical 
development…”14 This transplantation, Coderre notes, created serious problems, to which her 
analysis of later-stage Maoism investigates. Importantly, however, Coderre does not use these 
problems or the constraining ideology of “historical development” to negate the entire project of 
theorizing commodities under socialist circumstances. Rather, as she explains, the simplistic 
formulation “mask[ed] a paradox with a rich, transnational, and at-times contentious history....”15 
 
Soviet Space and the Socialist Commodity  
Here it is important to outline some of this transnational history. As Coderre notes, much of the 
Chinese theorization of the commodity under socialism came from the Soviet project.16 But in 
turning to the Soviet project, we see that the seemingly teleological and oversimplified 
formulation of the socialist commodity qua the subjection of capitalist objects to a higher stage 
of human development (socialist modes and relations of production) was actually a site of rich 
theorizations, theorizations which touched on the form of the department store. Specifically, 
Soviet avant-garde artists located in the idea of productive relations opening up the commodity 
 
14 Laurence Coderre, “A Necessary Evil: Conceptualizing the Socialist Commodity under Mao,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 61 (January 2019): 28-29. 
15 Ibid., 26. 




to new social significations not just a handy conceptual tool for justifying increased production, 
but a new way to route collective desires through egalitarian relationships and larger social 
projects. One such conception comes from the Constructivist artist, Aleksander Rodchenko, who 
articulated an idea of the commodity as an active participant in the revolution. As the art 
historian, Christina Kiare, argues, Rodchenko theorized that “the object can be a comrade to 
human beings when its mode of making and functioning is rendered transparent to the user and 
when the object mimics the movements of the human body.”17 Indeed, similar ideas are present 
in Zhang’s formulation of the Beijing Department Store. Zhang inserted his work as salesperson 
into the productive process, arguing that his labor offered the potential to actualize Communist 
practice because it was motivated by the goal of adequately meeting specific human needs rather 
than sales quotas.18 According to Zhang, meeting these needs by hand picking commodities for 
would-be consumers better equipped customers to maximize their own labor as builders of 
socialism.19 Thus, For Zhang, the Department Store acted as a microcosm of Communist 
socialist relationships, as the seller and the consumer confronted each other according to logics 
of individual need and mutual assistance. 
 
This microcosm mirrored the wider socialist world of mass campaigns and large infrastructure 
projects. Zhang understood that this wider world was fueled in part by the Department Store’s 
ability to coordinate distribution of goods to socialist workers, but he saw something above mere 
economic imperatives at work in his daily life as salesperson. For Zhang, the mediating link 
between these two worlds (the world of experimental social relations in the Department Store 
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and the world of large-scale socialist construction) was the commodity. It provided for the 
extraction of surplus in human terms; it produced satisfied socialist subjects who saw a reflection 
of themselves in the products of socialist industry while also equipping them to more 
productively contribute to labor outside the Department Store. This is reflected in his numerous 
anecdotes wherein he demonstrates how the proper selection of commodities rectified 
antagonisms between himself and the customer or the customer and themselves (what Mao 
would call “contradictions among the people”), in turn also rectifying material contradictions 
that kept workers from most efficiently contributing to socialism as the collective future of all 
Chinese subjects.20 Zhang’s reading of the commodity in the Beijing Department Store thus 
aligns with what Kiaer identifies as the Soviet artist, Boris Arvatov’s, theory of the socialist 
object, which “attempt[ed] to redeem in practical terms the utopian myth of social harmony—a 
Marxist humanist myth—for the proletarian culture of the future.”21 For Kiaer, the socialist 
potential of the commodity, according to these artists, was its physicality and specifically the link 
that physicality drew between collective fantasies and the material world.22 As objects, these 
commodities could circulate through spheres of production and everyday life, bringing those 
spheres into alignment with larger social goals.23  
 
For both these Soviet artists and Zhang, the potential for the object to harmonize the individual 
lifeworld with broader socialist projects coalesced around physical spaces. In connecting these 
two contexts, Rodchenko’s involvement with the Workers’ Club interior in Paris and the GUM 
 
20 Ibid.; Mao Zedong 毛泽东, “Guanyu Zhengque Chuli Renmin neibu Maodun de Wenti” 关于正确处理人民内部
矛盾的问题 [On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People], Renmin Ribao 人民日报 [People’s 
Daily], June 19, 1957. 
21 Kiaer, “Boris Arvatov’s Socialist Objects,” October 81 (Summer 1997): 114. 
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Department Store in Moscow is particularly illustrative. These two structures allowed 
Rodchenko to contextualize the potential of the commodity form against the Soviet New 
Economic Policy (NEP) and its wider goals of modernization, allowing Rodchenko to in turn 
offer practical critiques and formulate novel conceptualizations. The NEP, with the extent of its 
market and imported goods, differed centrally from the first Chinese Five Year Plan. 
Nevertheless, understanding Rodchenko’s analysis is helpful for juggling the similarly open-
ended potentials of the Beijing Department Store against the PRC’s drive for development and 
modernization that saw its construction.  
 
The Worker’s Club, an interior design exhibit arranged by Rodchenko for the Soviet Pavilion at 
the 1925 Paris Exposition Internationale des Arts Décoratifs, highlights another element of the 
Constructivist reading of the object: the utopian potential of mass production. Despite the 
criticisms of a socialism bent on advancing the forces of production, we should not lose sight of 
the emancipatory potential implied by mass production, which afforded the possibility of 
providing for all members of society. In looking at the Workers’ Club interior, we see how the 
same project of using the Communist discourse of progress to emphasize an unrealized potential 
corresponds to Rodchenko’s use of the form of modernist design, a style that centered on 
rationalization and utilitarianism of form to bring out this same potential in physical space. To 
this point, Kiaer notes how Rodchenko and Arvatov’s vision for objects to harmonize collective 
desires and political goals centered on the technological rationality of those objects.24 As with 
Zhang, the mass-produced character of socialist objects would not only reflect the drive to build 
a technologically advanced society in a single material thing (a microcosm of the wider socialist 
 




goal) but they would also bridge this goal with the everyday life of the socialist public. The 
Workers’ Club (Image 1.3), with its rational modernist design, slotted into this vision. However, 
as Kiaer rightly emphasizes, the handmade interior elements presented within this rational 
scheme represented Rodchenko’s nuanced understanding as well as his critique of the 
oversimplified nature of the Soviet discourse of advancing the forces of production. 
 
 
Image 1.4: Workers' Club Interior, 1925, Christina Kiaer, “Rodchenko in Paris,” October 75 (Winter 1996), 4. 
 
To understand the significance of this reading it is important to note the character of 
interventions in the built environment within these socialist projects defined by construction. 
While I will examine centrality of “construction” in the Maoist project, as well as the complex 
role of the built environment vis-à-vis the Marxist notion of production in chapter two, for now it 
is sufficient to note that both the Soviet and the Maoist project focused on the goal of 
construction (advancing the forces of production, but also redesigning cities) as a means of 




production. In this way, Rodchenko’s design of the Workers’ Club affirmed the international 
modernist style in the manner of Le Corbusier, which similarly linked buildings to production 
(Corbusier famously describing the house as a machine for living in).25 This reading lends to a 
theorization of utopia as the product of architectural rationalization, which invited deep critiques, 
as Kiaer and Rabinow note. However, similar to Rodchenko’s appropriation of orthodox 
discourse about the commodity, this reading of modernist style also presented an opening insofar 
as it allowed practices of design to take an active role in defining the parameters of revolution. 
Rodchenko attempted to seize this opening by negating interior design as “design” at all, instead 
labeling it ‘art’ practice.26 As the philosopher and historian, Susan Buck-Morss, argues, art for 
Rodchenko was not an act of documenting the revolution, but a project of participating in it.27 As 
such it provides a mediating link between a theorized type of un-alienated labor (socially 
significant art practice) and the resultant object as now comrade. Thus, this re-naming of design 
as art allowed Rodchenko to highlight the material result of design, bringing it to the level of 
objects, and thus (equally to the socialist commodity) a mediating physicality that could integrate 
political projects with everyday life and working class labor.  
 
Thus, in the Workers’ Club, Kiaer sees how the operationalization of bourgeois categories like 
“design” opened up a link between production and construction to signify more than economic 
imperatives (e.g. building socialist forces of production that were self-sustaining and competitive 
with the west) and instead point to the “utilitarian task of transforming everyday life.”28 To this 
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end, Kiaer notes the hand-designed furniture in the clubhouse, which gestured directly to the 
human rather than the machine. This potential for the real physical sites of socialism (buildings) 
to capture from international modernism a utilitarian power and harness it for the role of 
actualizing working class labor while also improving the lifeworld of humans relates to the 
Beijing Department Store in key ways. As also conforming to the modernist style, the 
Department Store hoped to effect a utilitarianism in its space. Square, concrete, and designed for 
optimal ventilation, the department store no doubt hoped to bring consumer activity under the 
rational control of the planned economy.29 But, the inclusion of manufacturing inside the 
building (including the on-site crafting of clothing articles for individual customers) and the care 
that Zhang notes among the sales workers in serving customers’ individual needs (rather than the 
needs of profit) hoped to transform this utilitarianism into service for the people and thus realize 
the egalitarian potentials of mass production in the present, rather than in the service of 
constructing some advanced socialism that belonged to the imaginary of party elites.30 This same 
hope underlies Rodchenko’s involvement with a department store.  
 
GUM and Socialist Modernization 
The hope embodied in the Workers’ Club and the Beijing Department Store undergirds 
Rodchenko’s involvement with a Soviet department store. Therefore, before discussing the 
Beijing example in earnest, I want to continue an examination of the Soviet case both to further 
contextualize the Beijing Department Store against global socialism and also to elucidate the 
potential of the socialist department store and internal critiques of its actual implementation. 
These critiques, specifically Rodchenko’s, allow us to formulate an analysis of the Beijing 
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Department Store’s ultimate failure (the ease with which it has been subsumed under 
contemporary post-socialism) without subjecting that failure to a teleological logic that reifies 
the contemporary capitalist economy as the inescapable destiny of China and the world. GUM 
(Glávnyj Universáľnyj Magazín), the large state-owned department store in the Red Square, 
differed from the Beijing Department Store and indeed Rodchenko’s own vision of socialism, 
but his attempt to rearticulate it through commissioned advertising work shows an 
acknowledgement of construction’s role in socialist modernization and a potential site for 



















Image 1.5: GUM exterior, present day and GUM interior, 1893, “GUM,” Wikipedia, accessed April 1, 2020, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUM_(department_store). 
 
Unlike the Beijing Department Store, the neoclassical structure of GUM was not built by the 
Communist government, but instead was a tsarist structure that the USSR merely nationalized. 
Moreover, embedded within the NEP, GUM (Image. 1.5) was a site of imported consumer 
commodities. Nonetheless, its existence inside a socialist system, and the way Rodchenko 
theorized its place therein, provides useful insights for understanding the meaning of the Beijing 




whose link to socialist Beijing will be elaborated in chapter two). Commissioned to design an 
advertisement for GUM, Rodchenko sought a “way out of the morass of NEP commodity 
culture….”31 His ad depicts a man looking up at a spectrum of commodities with text that reads 
“[e]verything that the heart, body, or mind requires-everything for the person is available at 
GUM.”32 For Kiaer, this ad (Image 1.4) shows Rodchenko’s critique of the capitalist commodity 
and the way it attempted to constitute the individual vis-à-vis things. Furthermore, the ad shows 
that Rodchenko’s was deeply wary of the fact that this character of the capitalist commodity 
penetrated the Soviet public, who, personified by the man in the ad, attempt to juggle the 
subjective pull of the objects without being subsumed by their totality.33 Kiaer underscores the 
role circulation plays in this image, a role that helps us understand the centrality of the 
Department Store as a physical place in the socialist landscape. Specifically, Kiaer explains 
Rodchenko’s view of commodity circulation as “the pathology of a system of capitalist 
exchange, in which surplus value feeds endlessly into a monstrously expanding system.”34 In 
using the word ‘pathology,’ Kiaer intelligently ties in Rodchenko’s analysis of the subjective 
dimension of the commodity (as an embodiment of collective desires and fantasies) to the logic 
of a social system and the social relations those subjective modalities perpetuate. What is 
important for us in Rodchenko’s analysis is the way it points to an internal critique of department 
stores under socialism. Indeed, as an active participant in this department store (conceiving of his 
art as socialist labor and revolutionary activity), Rodchenko was wary of the physical space of 
GUM as a distribution node in a system of production and consumption. It is important to 
understand this wariness (alongside the egalitarian potential Rodchenko saw in the commodity) 
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because it points to a broader critique of a particular productivist logic shared by the Soviet 
Union and the PRC while also showing how practices inside the department store can offer 
critiques of that logic. In locating GUM as the necessary physical container of this pathology, 
Rodchenko aimed a larger critique of the NEP’s modernization as founded on a capitalist 
impulse to harness endless surplus for the reinvestment and expansion of the system. Indeed, we 
can map this critique of the NEP onto China’s first Five Year Plan (which oversaw the Beijing 
Department Store). As the historian, Rebecca Karl, explains: “in 1953, the CCP opted for the 
Soviet path of development. This called for modernization based on maximum extraction of 
surplus from rural areas to fund heavy industrialization located in the cities.”35 While the nature 
of the market in the NEP and China were different, Rodchenko’s analysis that some crucial 
character of the capitalist drive toward endless expansion penetrated socialist modernization 
campaigns, and that this character—not the objects themselves—represented the failure of the 
Department Store to actualize its socialist potential, helps us contextualize the phenomenon of 
department stores under socialist projects: why they existed across multiple socialist contexts, 
how they are related to the modernization drives of those contexts, and how these drives 
deracinate the positive character of the circulating object. With this context, we can now analyze 
the Beijing Department Store as both a Chinese and a global phenomenon.  
 















Image 1.6: Rodchenko’s GUM advertisement, 1923. Christina Kiaer, “Rodchenko in Paris,” October 75 (Winter 
1996), 23. 
 
Rodchenko’s practice vis-à-vis GUM brings out a socialist critique of the physical spaces that 
house socialist commodities and the role those spaces play in an overarching, not quite capitalist 
economy. At the same time, Rodchenko and Arvatov show that the meaning of the commodity 
and the physical site of transaction were not circumscribed and inescapably capitalist. The idea 
that mass produced objects would occupy a new significance under new forces of production was 
not a totally hollow or teleological idea. Their reading of this formulation uncovered a real 
emancipatory potential in not only providing the abundance made possible by mass production to 
the whole of the collective but also in using the form of productive output (the commodity) to 
harmonize individual desires and individual experiences of everyday life with larger egalitarian 
social goals. But, the theorizations that these artists presented, as well as the actuality of GUM, 
had deep fissures and contradictions. Contradictions that the later Maoist theorization of the 




throughout this thesis, notably in chapter three where I present the literary critic, Cai Xiang’s, 
critique of the Marxist/Maoist impulse to subsume all relationships under the figure of the 
proletariat (an impulse which can be read alongside Arvatov’s desire for socialist harmony). For 
now, we are ready to return to the Beijing Department Store and begin to explain its meaning in 
the first Five Year Plan and Chinese urban space.  
 
Semincolonialism  
Unlike GUM, the Beijing Department Store was not a residue from the previous regime. It was 
constructed by the CCP in accordance with the Five Year Plan, which as we discussed centered 
on the extraction of surplus to be reinvested in urban construction. As the philosopher and 
economist Friedrich Pollock notes, a major facet of command economies is the reinvestment of 
designated amounts of surplus into socially defined projects according to some plan. But this 
component of a planned economy does not rule out similarities to market economies. Production 
and consumption, he explains “are two aspects of the same process…distribution serves as a 
means of integrating them.”36 What matters in differentiating these types of economies is the 
manner of distribution. Thus under socialist imperatives of distribution (based on a 
predetermined surplus allocation) the decision to distribute goods through a department store 
represents a different calculation than the goal of capitalist department stores, which instead seek 
to accrue profit for the sake of property owners who then reinvest it according to their interest. 
However, we should add the method, and specifically the physical form, used to coordinate 
distribution to Pollock’s formula. With this addition, the decision to use a department store at all, 
and indeed to construct one rather than simply operationalize an already extant building, 
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represents a peculiar choice. Despite the problem in reading colonialism and the built-
environment through a schema like Rabinow’s forms, colonialism indeed played a central role in 
this calculation. Specifically, the Chinese notion of “semicolonialism” represented a significant 
impetus. Like with the commodity under socialism, the socialist notion of semicolonialism 
represented a multifaceted and historically significant theorization. But as with the commodity, it 
harbored deep problems in translating concepts to actually egalitarian social relation, problems 
which foreshadowed the contradictions in the Beijing Department Store.  
 
As a complex notion, my goal will not be to give a full account of Chinese debates and 
conceptualizations of semicolonialism, but rather to extract an important kernel that helps us 
understand a dimension of the Beijing Department Store’s significance. Taken from Lenin, the 
idea of semicolonialism was used by Marxists in China both before and after the 1949 
Revolution to understand their situation in global terms. While never directly under foreign 
occupation (prior to the Japanese invasion), China nonetheless was subject to foreign authority in 
designated treaty ports and cities, and more deeply under threat of Western economic 
domination.37 While key events like the Boxer Rebellion are important to understanding these 
threats, for the current investigation, it is more important to understand this outside presence in 
terms of the theory that reflected it. As the historian Arif Dirlik notes, the very tangible threat of 
foreign domination articulated early Chinese Marxist understandings of the economic and 
historical significance of the Chinese ruling classes and state apparatuses, even articulating those 
theorizations that sought to ground an understanding of Chinese development internally (which 
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in turn often hinged on the reading of China as an “Asiatic society,” a concept taken from 
Marx).38 Eventually, these understandings congealed into the official doctrine of semicoloniality 
in the PRC. This doctrine was based on understanding Chinese society as lodged in a transitional 
state between Chinese feudalism and a nascent capitalism brought by imperial forces.39 This 
transitional nature allowed for theorizations of China as embedded in an uneven system as well 
as part of a global imperial struggle. This formulation often touched on space as a defining 
analytic and in some cases even allowed for a critique of the linear time evident in the word 
“transition.”40 Indeed, even Mao, who’s project of directly engaging the masses (indeed the 
“backward” peasant masses) in changing the relations of production, did not reduce 
semicoloniality to a spot on a timeline. Nevertheless, as the PRC came to power, the notion of 
transition as an imperative to escape a repressive project from the outside transformed into a 
project of catching up. As Karl explains, “in the orthodox party view, semicolonialism and 
semifeudalism were forms of the failure of the Chinese social and political relations to be 
transformed from a traditional to a more fully modern type.”41 While Mao rejected this view, it 
slotted in well with the exigencies of a Five Year Plan defined by Soviet-style advancement of 
productive forces. In attempting to scale the economy along western lines (in order to combat a 
global colonial project by matching it in industrial potential), it is clear that the department store, 
as a western economic component, was viewed as a necessary form for coordinating production, 
consumption, and distribution in that manner. Indeed, as Karl notes, the stageist take on 
semicoloniality became even more stultified and teleological after the Party’s reassessment of 
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socialism in the 1970s and 80s, a period after which saw the reintroduction of department stores 
and malls on a large scale.42 
 
Here, in the slotting in of department stores into a global narrative of linear historical 
progression, we see the nature of the Beijing Department Store in 1955, specifically its nature as 
professed by the Party. Indeed, despite Zhang’s own optimism about the Department Store’s 
potential to rearticulate a kind of socialist commerce (an optimism no doubt colored by the 
similarly open-ended moment of 1977  in which he wrote it—a moment before the Dengist 
hegemony that re-inscribed this linear progress), the Department Store in 1955 was a retail site of 
commodities meant to project to the consumer public a utopian image of modernity qua variety 
and productive capacity, roles not dissimilar from those of department stores in capitalist 
societies. As I have touched upon, the question of why the Communist Party, at that time seeking 
modernization through explicitly anti-capitalist and anti-urban means would implement the 
construction of a consumer department store in the center of the capital city sheds light on the 
particular goals and limitations of the early Communist project. But it also foreshadows 
contradictions that endure later into Maoism and beyond. To understand this means focusing on 
the beginning part of the above statement: its position in the very center of the city. Ultimately, 
illuminating the Beijing Department Store’s position in Chinese urban space provides the 
necessary starting point for understanding the particular convergence of communism, capitalism, 








Roots of a Contradiction 
The placement of the Department Store in Wangfujing is itself significant. The CCP had risen to 
victory over the GMD largely through its ability to draft peasants to its cause.43 Mao Zedong, 
leader of the CCP, had professed a vision of the city as “parasitic,” existing only for the purpose 
of consumption and surviving only via its ability to syphon productive labor from the 
countryside.44 The anti-urban disposition of the party elite as well as power now afforded to the 
masses rendered the new capital, Beijing, an open question with no clear answer for how to think 
much less design it.  
 
In response to this opening, the CCP invited architects and planners to propose designs. The 
ensuing debate represented a utopian opening wherein the possibilities of architecture and design 
synched with open-ended possibilities for social organization. The ultimate conclusion of this 
debate represents the closure of this opening and the instillation of a new logic whose tension 
and contradictions are still expressed in the urban environment of contemporary Beijing. The 
most famous proposal came from Liang Sicheng and Chen Zhanxiang. Both western-trained 
architects and historians, they proposed a design for Beijing that would maintain the city’s 
historic architecture as a public cultural preserve and position the administrative center outside 
the geographic center of Beijing. In his proposal, Liang realized that the modernist telos of 
constructing rationalized buildings with no deference to the already existing environment 
presented something contradictory to the Maoist project’s egalitarian aims. He argued that, 
“[i]ntroducing modern high-rise buildings to the central heritage area would alter the street 
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patterns and damage townscapes, which would be contradictory to our principles concerning the 
protection of cultural relics.”45  Liang specifically questioned the impact of constructing “main 
thoroughfares,” which by destroying communities in order to promote logistical flows, would 
create “serious problems…between government institutions.” Ultimately, however, Mao and the 
CCP rejected this proposal. Instead, the CCP followed the format of western and Soviet urban 
design and moved to designate downtown Beijing as a government center, destroying much of 
the historic structures.46 Liang correctly labeled this moment a turning point in the early years of 
the CCP, noting that it would destroy any “reasonable relationship with the residential 
quarters.”47 Some more recent scholars, like the art historian, Wu Hung, have identified this as 
the beginning of a contradiction that has never been resolved.48  
 
According to the plans that the CCP eventually chose, a government district would occupy the 
center of Beijing, and a series of succeeding sectors would follow in order of importance: next 
industrial manufacturing, and then finally a residential sector at the furthest perimeter to house 
the industrial worker.49 As the Party expressed at the time, “production first, life second.”50 This 
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is not to simplistically critique the party as anti-worker. According to CCP logic, the urban 
center represented a hub of capital and bourgeois control. Breaking this control with party 
buildings and distancing industry from the city center represented a particular socialist strategy. 
Placing residences at the outside was less an intentional policy of immiserating workers, and 
more of a contradiction brought out from a logic that on the one hand sought to raise the 
countryside and lower the city in social importance and on the other hand relentlessly sought 
industrialization in order to catch up with imperial powers, locating the necessary container of 
this production in the form of the city. Indeed, even intellectuals deeply sympathetic to the 
Maoist project identify this plan as a necessary evil.51 But as we will see, this decision 
inaugurated a tension that points to the incommensurability of this productivist paradigm 
(following Soviet style plans for maximum extraction of labor in order to commit surplus to 
heavy industry in the urban center) with goals of egalitarian social relations. And indeed, the 
result of this incommensurability survives today. Not only has the recent boom in productive 
potential of China failed to produces egalitarian conditions, but Beijing itself is still sutured by 
ever expanding concentric circles, divided by “ring roads,” with common people residing at the 
outer limits. This format was exported to other cities, and even China’s new cities, built from 
scratch over the last couple of decades, follow this same format (as do recent extensions to 
already existing cities).52 But unlike current megacities where the center (both in terms of 
physical space and importance) is occupied by commercial skyscrapers, Beijing of 1955 and 
Beijing of today is still defined by the monumental government buildings at the city center. All 
this is to say that despite this enduring rural/urban contradiction, the importance of the Party 
remains unquestioned throughout the PRC, and this is made evident by space itself.  
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What then does it mean that the Beijing Department Store was placed within this government 
sector as the literal center of the capital city and thus the symbolic center of China writ large? 
Indeed, the placement of the Department Store reveals a surprising dimension of the CCP’s 
philosophy. While industry remains at a slight distance to the city and thus occupies a position of 
subordination to the party, the consumer side of modernization, represented by the Department 
Store, is in the center, equal to the party. To understand the importance of this equivalence, we 
have to unpack what the Department Store represented and how it functioned in Maoist society.  
 
To untangle the significance of the department store under Maoism means to look at it as more 
than just an analytic for dissecting high-level political changes in socialist and post-socialist 
China. As with the Soviet example, real analysis comes from seeing these spaces as more than 
just nodes in a planned (modernizing) economy, as so doing makes it hard to escape the top-
down narrative that rendered these spaces’ industrial function as necessary outcomes of a 
historical stage. The Beijing Department Store was and is a real material structure. It exists in the 
city as a product of architectural design and working-class labor. This design and this labor 
articulate the experience of the Department Store for everyone from the consumer to employee 
and up to the stockholder, and thus it defines the contours of what the building can tell us about 
society and Communism. These social relations exist as a singularity only by way of the 
Department Store’s physical existence as a material structure. That is, the structure presents these 
competing social relations at a standstill. In the image of this historical department store, we can 
access amorphous processes of social labor and design in a congealed, (momentarily) static form. 




Seeing the Department Store 
In looking for the importance of the Beijing Department Store in revolutionary Beijing we have 
no clear rubric, as the orthodox Maoist literature did not theoretically or explicitly treat the 
Department Store, nor did its theory provide a critical method for disentangling its social role 
under Communism. In the official discourse, the Department Stores was subsumed under the 
Five-Year Plan’s push for increased production. Within this, official mention of the Beijing 
Department Store also hinted at a particular vision of utopia as production, and with this vision, 
an incipient residue of capitalist utopia seeped in. 
 
To commemorate its opening, the main state-run newspaper, the People’s Daily, ran a story 
praising the “largest department store in Beijing” side by side with an article praising the 
quantity of holiday commodities produced by new work units.53 This bifurcated praise split 
evenly between commodity production and commodity sale/consumption was replicated in the 
building itself, which, (as mentioned above) was dedicated to manufacturing in the top floors. 
But, within this official narrative of the Department Store, rather than point to a novel 
conceptualization of the commodity’s place in a socialist society, this split represented a 
contradiction. The actual account of the building and the commodities inside conformed much 
less to Rodchenko’s evaluation than it did to evaluations in the west. The article praises the sheer 
quantity and variety of commodities for sale. In so doing, the article acknowledges them as 
consumer commodities through its emphasis on novel children’s toys and modern clothing. The 
utopian thrust of this variety was clearly in its ability to project a sense of global modernity. The 
article explains that “this new department store has over 13,800 more types of goods than the 
 




previous [capitalist] largest department store in Beijing.” Importantly, “the variety of products is 
also more new (xinying, implying newness in time, modern-ness) than past stores.”54 Indeed, the 
People’s Daily’s account, despite its mention of production, is absent of even the rationalization 
that Rodchenko and Arvatov fixated on, lapsing instead to a depiction of the type of multitude 
that horrified Rodchenko upon his visit to stores in capitalist Paris.55 The People’s Daily article 
enumerates a series of specific commodity types that increased in variety and newness, rather 
than utility and technological sophisticated-ness. Elements of Arvatov’s “Marxist humanist myth 
survive,” notably in the articles assertion of in-house designers to craft personal clothing and 
cooling ventilation to give Beijing pedestrians reprieve from the elements. And indeed, we 
should not simplistically dismiss these components. As Buck-Morss notes, an element of the 
“utopics of sensuality” that the Constructivist proffered, (a utopia of pleasure deriving from the 
transcendence of physical need through means of advanced production) penetrated official 
socialist doctrine and was indeed a revolutionary thrust in ta society just recently defined by war, 
famine, and despotic and exploitative rule.56 However, in the context of the People’s Daily 
article (that is, the official conceptualization of the Department Store), these facets get subsumed 
under the primacy of the commodity and the needs of the planned economy. This is evident in 
the lack of Zhang’s notion of the Department Store occupants (producers and consumers) as 
builders of socialism with their own complex lifeworlds. All this is flattened by People’s Daily 
into the figure of the customer (guke). The example of rest areas for mothers is telling. As the 
article explains, “in order to minimize the fatigue incurred on female shoppers looking after kids, 
the third floor contains a ‘mother rest area.’”57 In the logic of the department store, the mother’s 
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fatigue gets operationalized as an impediment to shopping. The needs of the economy trump the 
needs of the collective. Indeed, this new planned economy was not marshalled to produce the 
kind of society wherein mothers’ needs were taken care of, but mothers needs were marshalled to 
the rationalization of production as the flipside of consumption. As I will investigate more 
deeply in chapter three, the inability of the Party to contend with the complexity of this lifeworld 
and realize it as a site of potential egalitarian relations was an enduring contradiction in the 
Maoist project.   
 
By positioning itself as the endemic microcosm of a new socialist order defined by variety, as 
well as the architectural reality of the store as a site of production, consumption, and rest, the 
Department Store was a “world in miniature,” a phrase used by the philosopher Walter Benjamin 
to describe the consumer experience of the late nineteenth century Paris arcades, themselves a 
new spatial formation that crystalized a change in European capitalism.58 For Benjamin, the 
capacity of the arcades to present the totality of capitalist relations packaged as a spectacle to a 
new consumerist public marks them as the precursor to the department store. While the origins of 
department stores in China are different from these origins, Benjamin’s assertion that the 
physical container of new relations of transactions holds crucial insights into the wider totality of 
social relations remains an important thrust. Starting from this point, we can sketch out the role 
of the Beijing Department Store and trace its relationship to wider relations of production in 
China and abroad.  
 
 




But in tracing the way the Beijing Department Store eliminated egalitarian potentials, I do not 
want to lose site of the enduring existence of those potentials. Indeed, maintaining the 
significance of this criteria as we switch our angle of vision to the repressive reality allows us to 
better understand the character of that reality and the force that effects this substitution. Indeed, 
the phrase “world in miniature” allows us to envision this microcosm of social relations as a 
prism that not only reflects a set totality, but one that gestures to other possible social 
arrangements. What I mean is that there are more than one “world,” and through the prism of the 
Department Store, we can see the refracted image of another possibility. Of course, this 
possibility is articulated by the shape of the prism, and this directs us to the physical space of the 
Department Store as the key site of analysis. Indeed, I do not mean to craft a metaphor here; 
rather, the image of a glass prism, as a discrete material object that manipulates the visual (light), 
is directly analogous to the image of the Department Store, itself a discrete material structure 
which manipulates those physical processes that pass through it. In the case of the department 
store, this process is time.  
 
The Paris arcades did not simply represent the abstract world of international commodity 
circulation. Rather, they represented a particular world envisioned by a class that stood to benefit 
from consumer capitalist relations: a world of repression and global unevenness. But the 
experience of walking through a department store was not an experience of flagrant domination; 
rather, it was one of abundance that projected a utopian feeling distant from the actual social 
relations they embodied. Where then does the utopian feeling of the Department Store come 
from? It must come from the outside, from the utopian imaginary of a different collective. This 




This manipulation occurs at the level of time. The department store’s abundance not only 
projected an image of a specific temporality, but in covering up this contestation between the 
ruling class that erected the structure and the consumer that sees its desires reflected back to it, 
the building displaces the site of class struggle from a spatial contestation to a question of 
temporal procession. And, indeed, this temporality is often shared by capitalism and 
Communism.  
 
Conclusion: Revolution, Time and Space 
In the words of the People’s Daily, and indeed even Zhang Binggui, we can see the construction 
of “revolutionary time,” a progressive temporal scheme that equates the passage of time with 
increased productive capacity and thus progress towards a utopian horizon. Indeed, in the above 
accounts of the commodity, we see how this progressive schema penetrated the thought of the 
Constructivists and Zhang alike, but also how they were able to manipulate it to form novel 
critiques. Buck-Morss notes this phenomenon in the Soviet context, arguing that these critiques 
constituted a “slippage in the meaning of words borrowed from the discourse of the political 
vanguard and applied to that of artistic practice was a strategy for gaining power in terms of the 
new idiom of cultural hegemony.”59 But that nonetheless, “even the boldest among the artists 
acquiesced to a chronological perception of revolution that acknowledged that the party had set 
the terms of the debate.”60 In turning to the Party evaluation of the Department Store, these 
“terms,” rather than those slippages, take precedent. And indeed, in spaces like the Department 
Store, those terms derived power from repurposing those utopian potentials. As Buck-Morss 
elsewhere argues, “[t]he Bolshevik Revolution appropriated these utopian impulses by 
 





affirming them and channeling their energy into the political project. Liberating visions 
became legitimating ones, as fantasies of movement through space were translated into 
temporal movement, re-inscribed onto the historical trajectory of revolutionary time.”61 
In connecting this to an investigation of the teleology presented by the Beijing Department Store, 
we see the global character of the CCP’s ideology. Indeed, numerous studies examine this 
modernist teleology in Chinese literature and film.62 But here, I want to argue that architecture is 
similarly a technology for the construction of this temporality, and indeed a crucial one. Unlike 
film and literature, urban space more clearly shows the coming into being of this temporality as a 
dialectical process of construction and use. The next chapter will be devoted to examining this 
process. For now, I introduce it to show that, viewed this way, the structure becomes essential. 
We cannot simply look at the abstract logic of capital; we must look at the architecture of the 
Department Store.  
 
Here, I do not mean architecture in a literal sense. Formally analyzing the design choices of any 
given department store is no doubt an important investigation (and indeed I have touched on 
those elements), but solely doing so would amount to ceding the ground of spatial analysis to an 
already rigidified “discipline” of architecture criticism, which slots in comfortably with the logic 
of modernity and its attendant class project. Rather, I mean to look at the physical space of the 
Department Store as its place within an overall architectonic of modernity through time (this is 
distinct from the formal architectonic of a planned economy). Within the structure of capitalism, 
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the Department Store represents an essential foundation. However, within the Chinese 
revolutionary context, the Department Store fit uniquely within a contradictory scheme of 
temporality, space, and the goals of the Communist project. Much of this investigative mode, of 
isolating structures and their attendant experiences to craft an overarching image of political 
reality, is expressed in Benjamin’s Arcades Project, but the method is not stated explicitly. In 
many ways, this implicitness and the subtlety of Benjamin’s montage-like presentation mirror 
the amorphous quality of his object of analysis, a burgeoning consumer capitalism. Unlike the 
gradual move to consumer capitalism in turn of the century France (a gradualness that obscured 
the class actors behind it), in China, this transition was explicit state policy. Increased 
commodity production and consumer relations were openly instituted onto the environment with 
a published Five-Year Plan. Unlike the second empire, the Maoist project explicitly equated its 
revolutionary goal with “construction.” In official party discourse, even the founding of the PRC 
was wrapped up in a notion of construction: the term used by the state to refer both to its official 
founding and its continued project of modernization, “Jianguo,” literally translates to “build a 
nation.” Of course, much of this building took the form of destruction, and the subsequent 
destruction wrought by post-socialist accumulation highlights this importance. If 
Haussmannization called for the Arcades Project, then post-socialism’s burying of an earlier yet 
crucial moment of Maoist construction similarly calls for a new analysis of a defining spatial 
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Finally, the Paris arcades presented not only a violent world but an insurgent world at its 
interstices. Indeed, in order to present a vision of world domination, the phantasmic world of the 
arcades had to graft repressive social relations onto the utopian visions of the collective it wished 
to preside over. Thus in turning to the arcades, Benjamin made a very political move—one that 
argues that the location for examining social contradiction and political philosophy is not the 
abstract world of states and state projects, but the real physical world of architectural 
configurations and the social relations they embody, physical worlds such as department stores. 
Turning this phrase “the world in miniature,” to Chinese department stores means seeing in 
Chinese malls not just the capitalist vision of reformist Chinese leaders and the interests of a new 
Chinese gentry, but the shifting contours of class and utopia within what was once the world’s 
largest emancipatory project and is now the world’s largest manufacturer. As such, the Chinese 
department store is not just a “Chinese” question, but a global one.  
 
In the following chapter, I analyze in depth the aforementioned dialectical process of 
construction and use—what I will articulate as a structure’s “constructive principle” and its 
resultant place in the given. Through a close reading of Benjamin’s “Paris Capital of the 
Nineteenth Century,” I look for a theoretical vocabulary capable of putting due emphasis on the 
built environment and of understanding historical transformations within a given physical space. 
Contextualizing this vocabulary against interventions in the Chinese built environment highlights 
fundamental contradictions in the Chinese Communist project, specifically the contradiction 
between modernist temporality and egalitarian social relations. In light of this contradiction, in 
the final chapter, I turn to contemporary debates over Chinese urban space and assessments of 




Benjaminian analysis of temporal/spatial dynamics with the fraught revolutionary potential of 
the Maoist experiment in order to understand the strange phantom of linear time that it could not 
seem to exorcise.  If revolutionary time exists by displacing spatial contestations for temporal 
ones, the following chapter’s investigation of the Arcades Project looks for a theorization that 
returns spatiality the forefront. Doing so will illuminate a vision of the Department Store and the 
first Five Year Plan’s political significance through the cracks in the post-socialist edifice. By 
more specifically outlining the contours of that spatial analysis we can turn it back onto Cai, 
imbuing his analysis of contradiction in Maoist ideology with a concrete analysis of the Beijing 
Department Store. 
 
As we stand in Beijing Department Store today, now a defining mall of Xi Jinping-era post-
socialism, a light flickers in the basement. As we journey downward we are tempted to see the 
maze of pipes and wires as the intrinsic foundation upon which the mall inevitable rises. But the 
light illuminates the piles of refuse that were relegated to the basement in the move to 
international capitalism. In the heap of handcrafted furniture and outdate manufacturing 
equipment once central to the Department Store, we see a different vision of the building’s 
history. Or goal is no less than unlocking the doors to the basement and letting that light shine 









CHAPTER TWO: BEIJING, CAPITAL OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The urban development of Beijing entered a new era in 1949, and, ever since, the contradiction between 
preservation and development has become more and more serious…Unfortunately, the gravity of this consequence 
has not been adequately appreciated. 
 -Wu Liangyong 
 
Introduction: A Modest Methodological Proposal  
In this chapter, I focus on Benjamin’s theorization of the built environment through analysis of 
important fragments from the Arcades Project, focusing mainly on its beginning exposé, “Paris, 
Capital of the Nineteenth Century.” Rather than explicitly theorize architecture, Benjamin 
constructed an account of Marxist economic theory through a discussion of dynamics in the built 
environment. In an attempt to create an alternative to theories that rely on metaphor, Benjamin 
took the Marxist idea of base and superstructure as literal, relating it directly to the real world act 
of construction and thereby unsettling the simplistic determination that is often attached to it. In 
so doing, he highlighted a series of central dynamics of urban space under modernity. The 
Beijing Department Store, as a complex structure within a Marxist and modernist urban space, 
proves uniquely applicable to this kind of investigation, which rather than attempting to order 
phenomenon with the use of an abstract conceptual lexicon, attempts to highlight the social 
relations embodied in physical structures. In first analyzing the parameters of Benjamin’s 
method and the centrality of construction in forging modernity, this chapter lays the groundwork 
for understanding the Beijing Department Store as more than a superstructural manifestation of 
China’s productive base, but instead as a centrally determinating factor of the Chinese 
Communist project, economically, politically, and culturally.  
 
I conduct this comparative investigation of the Parisian arcades and the Beijing Department 




arcades side by side with the Beijing Department Store, I hope to conduct a kind of montage, that 
rather than identifying an a priori theory that structures all urban design, upsets standard 
capitalist relationality in order to unearth unexpected connections between modernist projects 
and thus new possibilities for critique. Secondly, in attempting to parse out the significance of 
the Maoist state as a potentially egalitarian project that nonetheless followed the urban practices 
and teleological schema of capitalist countries in the west, I try to follow a process of locating 
new potentials that results from a placing the Maoist project in new relationships. In essence, by 
launching a critique of the linear temporality of the Five Year Plan, I hope to reroute the angle of 
vision through the prism of the department store (without losing sight of the criteria—
emancipation), so that those egalitarian fragments can emerge anew—but with a focus on the 
collective rather than the goal of modernization. Repeating this process across multiple elements 
of the Five Year Plan hopefully brings these fragments into the present, alongside the entirety of 
the Maoist project, in a way that can detach that moment from its placement in a timeline that 
leads neatly to the post-socialist contemporary. 
 
Ultimately, through this investigation, we find that massive political and economic changes 
brought about by the 1949 Revolution generated a crisis in Chinese modernity, which in turn 
engendered new potential subjectivities and social relations. Through the Five Year Plan and its 
attendant urban interventions, the state attempted to contain these subjectivities and map a 
specific reading of these changes onto the built environment as part of a process of translation 
into everyday life. In the figure of the department store, we see how this top-down project was 
internally contradictory between the CCP’s imperatives of egalitarianism and modernization. 




socialist public, who in these moments of crises, call up images of past emancipatory potentials 
in order to articulate the possibilities of the present. In this way, reading Benjamin provides a 
way to contextualize the egalitarian images provided by Zhang and Rodchenko and more 
concretely relate them to the often repressive reality of the built environment in these 
modernization projects. The Paris arcades, like GUM and the Beijing Department Store, 
represented an attempt to harness these collective images and rearticulate them as delimited 
desires that reproduce repressive relations of production. But this process was not all-
encompassing, and turning to concrete structures like Beijing Department Store shows major 
slippages. As both a physical residue of earlier colonial forms and a symbolic residue of pre-
communist social relations, the Beijing Department Store showed the instability of the party’s 
claim to progressive history. As a discrete and still extant structure, the Department Store also 
provides a potent site for an alternative theorization of urban Beijing, then and now.  
 
Understanding the Exposé of 1935  
“Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century” presents a constellation of different temporalities. 
Chiefly, Benjamin presents the visage of Paris in the 19th century, and that of the Paris he 
inhabited in the 1930s. The skeleton that holds this constellation together is the built 
environment. By linking these moments together via their shared physical space of urban Paris, 
Benjamin attempted to rethink the Marxist metaphor of base and superstructure in a way that 
would divorce it from the specter of linear progressive history. As we will see, the project of 
connecting 1850s Paris to 1930s Paris is vulnerable to the gravitational pull of teleology, of 
drawing a straight line through time that sees the former as leading inexorably to the latter, and 




fundamentally opposed to this linear history; indeed, he saw it as the result of violent class-
warfare waged by the property-owning class. However, arranging time without this straight 
arrow is a difficult task, no less so because for Benjamin, history really did exist: times were 
distinct, historical moments were transient—and yet the capitalist forms that arose in the 1850s 
expressed the dominant consumerism and commodity character of his time. In “Paris, Capital of 
the Nineteenth Century,” Benjamin investigated how to rectify this expression without recourse 
to linear causality. Ultimately, to rectify these temporal connections required stepping outside the 
language of modernity.  
 
Faced with these contradictions, Benjamin constructed a new vocabulary consisting of 
descriptors like “residue” and “wish image” in order to make sense of these real changes over 
time in a delimited physical space still defined by unchanged commodity flows and unchanged 
class domination. Ultimately, unpacking this vocabulary unearths an investigation of time 
spatially—a method particularly adept for articulating the significance of the Beijing Department 
Store as a discrete structure standing at the nexus of nationalism, socialism, and post-socialism. 
In “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” Benjamin presented a constellation of spatial 
forms all existing at once to show how the myth of linear time originates from a class project of 
spatial construction. Through this presentation, Benjamin constructed glimpses of the dialectical 
opposite: a nonlinear space, one with the potential to free the revolutionary subject from the 
constraints of progress and open up the potential for real change. The PRC, as both a modernist 
project defined by linear revolutionary time and an egalitarian project defined by its active 
engagement in anti-bureaucratic and anti-urban revolution, seems to represent both the object of 




moment against Benjamin’s history of bourgeois urban intervention and its revolutionary flip-
side, we can better evaluate the CCP’s urban interventions, its conception of time, and its 
emancipatory horizon—all against the wider backdrop of modernity.  
 
Building the Base and Superstructure 
Benjamin’s examination of these temporal relations relies on spatial images. In the case of 
“Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” Benjamin focused on the Marxist division between 
base and superstructure as the subtext for imaging these relations. As stated by Marx in A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, “[t]he totality of [the] relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and 
political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.”64 
Benjamin focused on this metaphor largely because it was taken up by the social democrats of 
his time to make peace with the myth of linear history and subsequently the repressive reality of 
their historical moment. If the productive economic base of society was bound to revolutionize, 
and these revolutions determined the relations of production, then the concrete intervention of 
the working class could be erased as a necessity. Thus, the metaphor of base/superstructure 
allowed an entry point for an incipient teleology into Marxism. Similarly, this metaphor and its 
shifting interpretation was crucial to the actions of the CCP. Indeed, Mao was equally critical of 
the social democratic position. As he stated in the foundational “On Contradiction:”  
This is a mechanical materialist view, not a dialectical materialist view. It is true that 
productive forces, practice, and the economic base generally appear as the principle 
deciding factor. Whosoever does not recognize this is not a materialist. However, under 
 




certain conditions, the relations of production, theory, and the superstructure manifest the 
decisive function. This must also be recognized.65 
 
 
Here, the words Mao uses for base (jichu, foundation) and superstructure (shangceng jianzhu, 
architecture of the upper levels) are architectural. However, in this quote, he does not dispense 
with the conception of time that holds base/superstructure up as metaphorical. That is, in 
presenting base and superstructure as universal categories in a scheme of historical development, 
the two ideas become trans-historical concepts, divorced from any real relationship to images of 
foundations and architecture. They are merely connected via a figure of speech to the idea of a 
foundation and the structure above it. Mao questions their inter-determination, but insofar as 
these concepts are endowed with a transhistorical character, they assume the temporality of 
modernity and fail to transcend. By divorcing these images from any relationality to concrete 
architectural practices, the extent to which they can adequately be used to identify potentials for 
rethinking human relationships in space is curtailed. They instead take on the function of 
describing human relationships through time. This is more concretely illustrated by taking Mao’s 
conceptualization to its logical conclusion under the CCP’s first Five Year Plan. Whereas the 
Communist revolution was made possible because of the backwardness of Qing Dynasty and the 
Nationalist Guomindang (as impediment to the potential development of productive forces), once 
these forces were freed by the Communist revolution, the development of the economy again 
becomes determinate. Since there is no more advanced superstructure than a Communist party, 
the ensuing socialist project simply becomes the revolutionizing of productive capacity. Then, as 
if by magic the role of the working class is once again simply to work. Clearly, some 
 






determining component of capitalism still pulls the strings of this Communist society, and this 
control is not met with any disquiet. To this point, Benjamin argued in his notes that “[o]nce the 
classless society had been defined as an infinite task, the empty homogenous time was 
transformed into an anteroom, so to speak, in which one could wait for the emergence of the 
revolutionary situation with more or less equanimity.”66  
 
Turning back to Benjamin, however, we see that the idea of base and superstructure, despite its 
susceptibility to modernist temporality, represented a powerful spatial image in its own right, one 
that helps us locate the significance of construction in Benjamin’s theorization. This reverse of 
base/superstructure (qua metaphor) also helps us understand the other side of the Maoist project, 
which despite its stated need for increased productivity, is remembered most for its voluntarist 
movements like the Cultural Revolution that sought to rearticulate society and relations of 
authority away from those engendered by these same drives for production.67  The structure that 
held together these competing potentials is construction. As Benjamin explained, Marx’s own 
use of base/superstructure realized the necessity of construction for relating historical moments. 
From this insight, base/superstructure can be more than just metaphor but a real image: real 
construction in the physical built environment. As Benjamin later argued, “[Marx] realized that 
the history of capital could be constructed only within broad, steel framework of a theory.”68 
Benjamin’s use of the “image” is complicated. For our purposes, I use image to signify the 
analytical potential that comes from asking the reader to visualize the Beijing Department Store 
in order to capture the intersection of social relationships it embodied in 1955—rather than 
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stultify it into either an economic concept or an architectural form. These images were real, for 
Benjamin, not only mental but also material, and as such I want to draw on another component 
of his theory vis-à-vis architecture. Specifically, Benjamin saw images as real pictures that could 
be arranged cognitively in the manner of montage, such that the material landscapes they 
depicted are mentally placed in new relationships outside of those presented by modernity’s neat 
chronological history. Placing these landscapes outside of that history reveals hidden locations 
for collective action—not only theoretical spaces but actual physical ones.69 And indeed, Kiaer, 
(whose reading of the constructivist project relies on Benjamin’s dialectical images), showed 
how illuminating the emancipatory potential of theorizations like Rodchenko’s not only 
conceptually re-situated the commodity, but also re-situated GUM as a physical site of 
revolutionary intervention. The above quote about Marx shows Benjamin’s belief that 
base/superstructure could also be a potent image with this kind of capacity to upset accepted 
relationalities within modernity. Its ability to do this was embedded in its relationship to 
construction, that is, by taking base and superstructure to really signify something material rather 
than conceptual: architecture. 
 
Benjamin’s investigation focused on the architecture of nineteenth century arcades, glass roofed 
alleyways containing shops that housed and displayed some of the first consumer commodities. 
Benjamin attempted to link the arcades to their productive (base) antecedents without reifying 
the arcades as an inevitable form necessarily arising out of that material. Benjamin did this 
through a complex theoretical structure wherein political crises and new technological 
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possibilities rearticulate forms of the built environment. To show this, Benjamin drew on iron as 
the “condition for the emergence of the arcades.”70 Specifically, it was not iron’s sudden 
invention (indeed it had been around for centuries) that led to the arcades, but the possibility to 
prefabricate it—a possibility which arose in the mid-1800s out of the need for more extensive 
railroads. The transplantation of this prefabrication from railroads to urban space represented a 
complex relationship between social relations of transportation and possible applications for 
existing materials. The end result was a new “constructive principle” in architecture, which 
birthed the necessary spatial forms for thinking the arcades as a possible architectural object. The 
production of iron alone was not the condition of possibility for the arcades; rather, the needs of 
transportation embodied in the railroads combined with the frames of subjectivity they 
engendered (i.e. prefabrication, space thought of scalable units) to yield the possibility of the 
arcades.  
 
This idea of “constructive principle” qua real material practices that result from a complex 
interaction of technology and subjectivity offers a useful alternative to Rabinow’s “forms” in 
thinking the Beijing Department Store. Armed with this critique of linear time’s ability to de-
contextualize historical processes, we can see how “forms” could be read as the inevitable result 
of a colonial project that places China on the same timeline as other modern countries and 
therefore predestined to follow its architectural forms. Furthermore, the emphasis that Rabinow 
puts on social control forces us to read urban planning as a top down system of discipline. This 
seems ill-suited to understanding the significance of a Communist project that actively engaged 
in dismantling those colonial and capitalist relations. Nonetheless, the Maoist project had real 
 




problems. These problems are best elucidated by looking at Chinese department stores like 
Benjamin did the arcades. Treating the Beijing Department Store as an image wherein competing 
and contradictory social relations exist at a standstill allows us to avoid operationalizing it as 
evidence for an abstract theory and thereby subsuming it into that theory’s narrative of history. 
Instead, tracking the Department Store through these levels of critique to illuminate its 
constructive principle (and ultimately its resultant place in a repressive reality), shows the 
structuring role of linear time as omnipresent across both capitalist and socialist conceptions.  
 
The Department Store’s Constructive Principle 
But what is the constructive principle of the Beijing Department Store? Clearly some element of 
the same subjectivity permeated this structure. The specific intersection of semicolonialism (qua 
a moment in time) and the productive exigencies of the Five Year Plan no doubt lent themselves 
to a prefabricated concrete box that could be reduplicated throughout the urban environment to 
act as a scalable node of distribution. Even here, like the arcades, we can see the subjective pull 
of the railroads, as trains were a recurrent motif in cinema of the time, projecting the country’s 
rapid progress towards a higher stage of industrial capacity.71 Following this image, we can 
imagine the Department Store as a kind of railway station, wherein the economy, as a train, 
passes through, offloading its contents and taking on new ones—that is, unloading industrial 
output and accruing the capital generated from consumption to then be passed on for 
reinvestment in production. It seems no coincidence that the Department Store’s architect, Yang 
 




Tingbao, was perhaps best known at the time for his redesign of the Nanjing West Railway 











Image 2.1: Nanjing West Railway Station by Yang Tingbao, Chen Yi, “After 104 Years of Service, The Nanjing 
West Railway Station Withdraws from History, Having Witnessed Countless Events,” Yangzi Evening Paper, 




However, in 1955, Chinese society was not viewed solely in economic terms, not even by the 
Party. Indeed, the egalitarian project of the Maoist state must also be factored into the 
Department Store’s constructive principle. As I have noted both in regards to the Soviet project 
and the Maoist project, there was a real utopian potential in mass production—in affording the 
consumer abundance of western societies to the socialist collective in an egalitarian way. This is 
no doubt reflected in those elements of the Department Store’s design that I have enumerated 
(hand-made production, ventilation, rest areas, etc.). But taking this utopian potential from 
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capitalist production runs the risk of also taking its exploitative logic. This Benjamin astutely 
noted, explaining of the Soviet NEP: 
Should the European correlation of power and money penetrate Russia, too, then perhaps 
not the country, perhaps not even the party, but Communism in Russia would be lost. 
People here have not yet developed European consumer concepts and consumer needs. 
The reasons for this are above all economic. Yet it is possible that in addition an astute 
party stratagem is involved: to achieve, at a freely chosen moment, a level of 
consumption equal to that of Western Europe—the trial by fire of the Bolshevik 
bureaucracy, steeled and with absolute certainty of victory.73 
 
 
Here, Benjamin saw how the asceticism we might associate with Soviet design was not solely the 
result of economic backwardness, nor intentionally repressive, but rather keenly cautious, 
waiting for the correct moment (the impending “trial by fire”) to provide a level of commodity 
abundance. Because, to prematurely proliferate mass produced commodities means to invite the 
repressive potential of commodity reification and subject the socialist system to capitalist logic. 
We can see how the rational, utilitarian design of the Beijing Department Store represented a 
reflection of the economic needs of the first Five Year plan alongside this frame of subjectivity: 
calculated austerity in design and warranted circumspection of the commodity. Indeed, the 
decision to commission Yang was no doubt a result of this constructive principle, as his specific 
reading of the Soviet architectural credo “nationalist form, socialist content,” came to dominate 
the Chinese landscape as a way of resolving these competing imperatives of ornate abundance 
and ascetic monumentality (alongside nationalism and internationalism) at the level of design.74 
Nonetheless, some of this capitalist “correlation” penetrated the Department Store as we saw in 
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chapter one (notably through the customer), and this was reflected in its constructive principle, 
which largely took its interior design from western department stores (Image 2.2). Here, I want 
to focus on how the inscription of this correlation in its constructive principle rendered the 
resultant structure, and all those relations that pass through it, in some way contradictory to 
Maoism’s egalitarian project. Indeed, this explains the intensity of those Maoist projects like the 
Cultural Revolution, which in taking aim at the bureaucratization and bourgeois-ization of the 
Five Year Plan, also took aim the department store.  
 
Image 2.2: Beijing Department Store Interior in 1955, photograph by Wang Zhiyuan, from “Beijing’s Newly 
Constructed Department Store,” People’s Daily. 
 
Trial by Fire: Five Year Plan and the Collective 
Placing the Beijing Department Store back into its context through the notion of a constructive 
principle allows us to see the way it arose out of the particularity of the Five-Year Plan. At the 
level of experience, the Department Store also represented the imposition of a utopia defined by 
this increased production, a utopian image penetrated by the correlation of commodities with 
modernity and ultimately money with power. This reactionary utopia existed in tension with the 
Five Year Plan’s cautionary utilitarianism, expressed as economic necessity driven by outside 




resolving them. It slotted the political need of advancing production and urban design onto a 
timeline (rendering the Department Store evidence of progress), while substituting the utopian 
potential of its contained objects with the sheer variety and “modernity” of its commodities as 
evidence of forward movement into utopia. 
 
Liang Sicheng, the architect whose plan for Beijing was rejected (and who became a vocal critic 
of Yang’s designs), related the construction of department stores to both the industrial exigencies 
of the first Five Year Plan as well as to possible utopian dimensions. Liang asserted the 
department store as an outcome of a new principles in architecture, specifically the rerouting of 
architecture from a commercial imperative to a humanist one. He claimed that, “[p]ublic 
buildings of diverse nature, from government offices to department stores, etc., constitute no 
small a part of the architects’ work.”75 The collapse of government offices and department stores 
into the category of “public buildings” (while perhaps liable to be anachronistically read as 
evidence of the party’s totalitarian grip) represents a positive re-theorization of consumption as a 
social act in need of novel architectural practices. Indeed, in the same paragraph, Liang goes on 
to enumerate schools as well as “theaters, palaces of culture, clubs, exhibition galleries…” as 
belonging to the same category and thus similarly the product of social relationships that should 
be encouraged and expanded by new architectural forms. However, Liang’s theorization of this 
new architectural imperative driven by the needs of the collective existed alongside the 
simultaneous theorization of architecture as subservient to the needs of “progress,” an abstract 
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concept that quickly slips from relating to the material needs of real people and into signifying 
the needs of increased industrial capacity in and of itself. Liang explained:  
“[n]eedless to say, the one field in building activities that ranks in supreme prominence is 
that of industry. It is the field that the Chinese architects found themselves face to face 
with entirely new problems. The state of industrial development under the reactionary 
regimes offered hardly any opportunity for the architects to practice in industrial 
architecture.76  
 
Here, Liang does not relate industry to the needs of the people, nor even to the needs of national 
defense; he relates it instead to some abstract notion of progressive time. This is evident in his 
theorization of the “reactionary regime,” the capitalist GMD, as somehow not capitalist enough. 
Indeed, this quote has striking resemblance to the earlier quote by Mao in “On Contradiction.” 
Essentially, the productive forces are theorized as a linear progression through empty time and 
space. Architecture is less a social action intervening in space, and more an exercise correlating 
to a predetermined position on a timeline.  
 
Thus, it is becoming clearer how the thought of Mao and those architects engaged in a process of 
redesigning the city held both a potentially egalitarian vision of concrete urban relations and an 
image of history that reduced these visions to rehearsals of a predetermined project. But to this 
formulation we must add the Communist public, specifically figures like Zhang, who as a laborer 
inside the structure produced novel conceptualizations through concrete practice. The complexity 
of the Department Store—a static physical structure designed by elites but punctuated by mass 






subjectivity behind a given constructive principle are not predetermined, but are instead the 
result of a contestation between a collective imagination and the dominant economic order. 
First and foremost, it is crucial to note that he role of this collective imagination is not limited to 
the ways in which a productive material might be applied to social organization. This would 
make it already subject to the ideology enabled by that productive change. What I mean is that 
for imagination to be a simple contemplation on how iron can be used to make arcades assumes 
the immediate dissolution of every form prior to iron as potential for articulating the possibilities 
of iron. In effect, this understanding accepts a teleology wherein iron was always going to lead to 
the arcades. Instead, Benjamin quotes the architecture critic, Sigfried Giedeon: “construction 
plays the role of the subconscious.”77 That is, the built environment reflects, in its becoming, the 
reality of new technologies as the collective attempts to make sense of them through older 
concepts. But this contention happens only on the cusp of our conscious awareness. Later in the 
Arcades Project, Benjamin notes to himself: 
Attempt to develop Giedion's thesis. "In the nineteenth century," he writes, "construction 
plays the role of the subconscious." Wouldn't it be better to say "the role of bodily 
processes"-around which "artistic" architectures gather, like dreams around the 
framework of physiological processes?78 
 
For example, in just the way that falling asleep hungry leads to dreams of eating, the sudden use 
of anonymously prefabricated building materials leads to an anonymously prefabricated 
landscape: the arcades. Thus, Benjamin’s argument that the “[arcade] is a city, a world in 
miniature” takes on a clearer meaning. The arcades represented, both physically and 
ideologically, a microcosm for the temporal regime of capitalism writ-large, a microcosm that 
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was constructed by anonymous architects who carved out an area of the city and designated it a 
unit simply through the instillation of wrought iron trusses and manufactured glass panels.79 We 
have already seen that this has clear parallels to the utilitarian rationality of the Beijing 
Department Store and its theorized role in an economic system of surplus extraction. Indeed, this 
moment in socialism also saw the absence of singular architectural provenance, as building like 
the Department Store were anonymously ascribed to “the worker” as in the People’s Daily’s 
account, which bears no mention of Yang.80 When the collective imagination undergoes changes 
in its subconscious (and subsequently the built environment) because of changes in the economic 
base, these changes are contested between the dominant class and the collective. These 
contestations take place over the translation of older arrangements—like the translation of the 
department store from capitalism to communism. 
 
The Old and the New 
Revolutionary Beijing was marked by massive construction and destruction. To make way for 
the industrial districts around the government center, and to broaden roads to fit structures like 
the Beijing Department Store, the CCP demolished large swaths of the historic city and parts of 
the ancient wall that surrounded it.81 The party maintained that to destroy the old society (Jiu 
Shehui), old structures had to be literally demolished, a policy that reemerged with particular 
viciousness during the Cultural Revolution.82 This impulse is mirrored in the physical 
construction of the Department Store on top of what was previously the Qing Dynasty’s 
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commercial center, and also mirrored symbolically through its labeling as the first department 
store of “New China” (Xin Zhongguo), despite the presence of department stores in the city prior 
to the revolution. We can see how the effort to dismantle the physical signifiers of the previous 
repressive regime might represent a real revolutionary impulse. However, this revolutionary 
drive to create a “New China” both ideologically and physically seems to contradict the creation 
of a department store, a quintessential form of capitalism (which also re-inscribes Wangfujing as 
a commercial spot, albeit under new control). And yet, this destruction seems not too dissimilar 
from the project of Haussmannization, in which the city of Paris was similarly redesigned to 
create massive thoroughfares at the behest of a new dominant class (recall how Liang 
specifically highlighted thoroughfares as the core contradictory element in the design plan for 
Beijing). Both these redesigns were motivated by crisis. In the context of Paris, this crisis was 
the revolution of 1848, which posed an existential threat to the French bourgeoisie. In China the 
crisis was the 1949 Revolution, which despite beginning an emancipatory project also gave rise 
to the dogmatic and linear interpretation of semicolonialism and “transition” that presented the 
CCP with the task of modernizing the country and building a self-sustaining infrastructure of 
surplus extraction and reinvestment out of the ruins of a wartime economy. The essential 
difference in these two cases is what class did the destruction and to what purpose, and the 
Chinese case no doubt presented more potential for articulating society in an egalitarian way then 
the subsequent rise of Napoleon III in France. This should not be understated. But the fact that 
the same impulse existed in capitalist projects of accumulation shows that not only was the form 
of the Beijing Department Store not totally “new” but that neither was the program of urban 
design behind it. I do not mean to say that redesigning cities is an inherently repressive project. 




of crisis but rearticulate its meaning by making it accessible to the public and maintaining some 
semblance of harmony between already existing residential quarters and new construction; 
whereas the accepted plan maintained only those ancient structures that could project Party 
power (like the Forbidden City) while rationalizing the rest of the city for maximum surplus 
extraction and logistical efficiency, rather than worker livelihood. This similarity of the Beijing 
plan to both Benjamin’s analysis of Paris’s elite-driven urban renewal and the content of that 
renewal (destruction, large thoroughfares, etc.) reinforces the existence of a contradiction in 
urban planning after the Chinese Revolution: the party was following some image of modernity 
and modernization fundamentally at odds with a truly “new” society. Modernity, it seems, has a 
specific blueprint for the city, and in seeking “modernization,” the PRC proved pervious to it, 
despite the Party and the collective’s egalitarian aims. 
 
Conclusion  
The Beijing Department Store sat contradictorily in-between competing schemas for translating 
collective wish images into everyday life. It thus confronted the socialist public as a living, 
breathing dialectical image: a contradictory embodiment of competing politics of time and space 
sitting in a momentarily static location of everyday life in downtown Beijing. Its rational, 
utilitarian design and humanistic interior elements both spurred Communist modernization and 
questioned it. The Department Store presented the collective wish-image of abundance, the 
realization of affluence previously only available to the elites in colonial department stores but as 
a universal—an image of victory over Benjamin’s trial by fire. However, it was simultaneously 
the product of a top-down project of modernization and an urban redesign plan meant to promote 




contradiction between the state’s commitment to egalitarianism and the state’s commitment to 
modernity, all against the backdrop of the socialist collective’s own imagination.   
 
Reading these contradictions through the Arcades Project allows us to re-insert space as the 
central analytic for understanding the potentials and failures of the Five Year Plan and its vision 
of the built environment. Despite its assertion of a predefined plan for modernization, in reality, 
the Beijing Department Store arose out of a specific set of spatial politics: both politics of 
modernization and politics of collective action. The Department Store had a specific constructive 
principle, itself the product of global translations of modernity and collective modes of 
egalitarian relationality. It was more than just a superstructural element of the PRC’s economic 
base. The Department Store was a constitutive element of Communist modernity. Therefore, 















CHAPTER THREE: AT THE SHOPCOUNTER OF THE REVOLUTION 
 
 In the minds of Marxists, then, the entire sphere of social consciousness and many aspects of social practice (e.g. 




Placing Benjamin’s examination of the spatial significance of the French arcades (as precursor to 
the department store) side by side with the spatial politics of the first Five Year Plan illuminates 
a central contradiction, namely the contradiction between the modernist temporality of the Five 
Year Plan, which theorized a linear progression of productive modes and thus reified the 
repressive relations of industrial production as a necessary component of history’s progress, and 
the collective’s own image of the socialist city and the socialist object. Unlike the Soviet Union, 
however, this contradiction found expression in official party theory, specifically through the 
Maoist “Mass Line,” which sought to directly involve the population in the task of constructing 
new egalitarian social relations in the present.83 The Beijing Department Store sat at the 
crossroads of this contradiction, presenting the wish-image of modernist abundance but subjected 
to new, potentially liberatory logics of redistribution. Yet, at its core, in 1955, the Beijing 
Department Store fulfilled the function of linking production and consumption within the CCP’s 
planned economy, producing the surplus necessary for investment in construction, a function that 
rendered the building susceptible to the repressive logic of capitalist industrial production. The 
Department Store presented these competing potentials as a fragile unity, and thus offers 
important insights into the significance of the crisis at the center of socialism. 
 
 




In his investigation of the Maoist period, the Chinese literary critic, Cai Xiang, articulates the 
crisis of Maoism as the incommensurability of modernism and egalitarianism. Focusing much 
less on the structuring role of linear temporality and urban design, Cai nonetheless argues that 
modernization implies a specific arrangement of industrial production which in turn engenders 
new class divisions and new desires at odds with the Maoist theorization of class difference. 
Cai’s focus is on the later 1950s and 60s, but the Beijing Department Store shows this 
contradiction to be at play as early as 1955. Furthermore, in turning Cai’s analysis onto the 
Department Store as an emblem of the first Five Year Plan, we can get a clearer image of the 
contradiction in spatial terms and root it more concretely in the history of the PRC. 
 
Cai investigates mass campaigns of the 1960s and their literary representations in order to locate 
this contradiction. Furthermore, he examines these mass campaigns not just as the violent result 
of this contradiction, but rather as evidence of the CCP’s awareness of crisis and ultimately the 
lack of tenable solutions within official Marxism. This analysis shares much with Benjamin’s 
critique of the Social Democrats and the Soviet Constructivists’ critique of GUM and the NEP. 
Thus, by reading Cai’s analysis alongside the structuring role of linear time and the centrality of 
physical spaces like the Beijing Department Store in holding up this temporality, I return to 
Zhang Binggui’s account to show how this contradiction manifested in tensions between urban 
and rural subjects and between consumers and producers. Finally, I read the Department Store as 
evidence of Chinese Communism’s preliminary attempts not only to institute a level of material 
abundance but also to address the ‘trial by fire’ that accompanies it. Ultimately the Beijing 




ultimately ‘customer,’ both intensifying the threat of penetration by capitalist logics and 
rendering it incapable of addressing them directly. 
 
The Crisis of Socialism  
Cai’s analysis of contradiction in Maoism is unique, as he provides a rigorous reading of 
fundamental tensions and their inadequate resolutions, but does so from a leftist position that 
does not trivialize the emancipatory potential of the revolutionary project. This rigorous reading 
asserts that the problems of the Maoist project were not solely due to outside threat (though this 
was extremely important), but rather the institutional arrangement itself had deep flaws.84 As 
mentioned above, Cai argues that the Party’s inability to rectify these flaws points to “an 
overreliance on the traditional mode of class struggle and a lack of formal innovation.”85 
Reading the Maoist project from the left, then, presents this same challenge (that is, how to 
address a deficit in Marxism with a Marxist critique). Cai tackles this challenge by first explicitly 
drawing a line between the exigencies of the socialist quest for state power as informed by 
Marxist theory and the dimensions of socialism in a given state after conquest. With this 
division, Cai reads the Maoist project from 1949-1976 as the “after the revolution,” (literally, the 
30 years after: hou sanshinian). For Cai, the socialism of ‘after the revolution’ is a “productive 
instillation,” not a decontextualized concept but a “historical process,” a specific interaction 
between forces both material and ideological, all arising from and tethered to a specific historical 
conjuncture. Cai, like Benjamin, avoids presenting this idea as a mere metaphor. Indeed, 
“installation” (zhuangzhi) in Chinese denotes a kind of equipment; like Benjamin’s “constructive 
principle,” zhuangzhi is related directly, not metaphorically, to the material dimensions of the 
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processes it describes. This material dimension is socialism’s “emphasis on construction, [both] 
political construction and economic construction…” This construction is precisely what makes it 
an “installation” and thus totally distinct from “the previous large-scale revolutionary movement 
aimed at resistance and overthrow,” which are all too easily put under the same category of 
“socialism” in the historiography.86 
 
As mentioned, Cai understands the crisis of socialism as a contradiction between modernism and 
egalitarianism. Importantly, this does not mean that socialism is in contradiction with 
modernism, but rather that the totality of “socialism” (as a productive installation in China) 
contained both these contradictory components. Put more concretely, socialism birthed “not only 
the concept of equality but also new social differences.” 87 The differentiation of social classes 
was an ineluctable result of the division of labor necessary for rapid industrial expansion pursued 
in the Soviet fashion. Indeed, as Pollock noted in his instigation of planned economies, even 
when the market system is replaced by a centralized organization, this “new system must 
produce certain functions which are necessarily connected with the division of labor.”88 For 
Pollock, the shift to a centrally planned economy displaces the profit motive with the “power 
motive,” which no less precludes class differentiation.89 Thus, despite the re-inscription of 
increased production as a communist goal (i.e. for “the people”), in following a modernization 
model, it still affected anti-egalitarian, and often capitalist relationships of production.  
 
 
86 Ibid., 404. 
87 Ibid., 358. 
88 Pollock, 74. 




While the attempt to describe increased production as “for the people” represents an ideological 
claim, I do not mean to ignore the fact of real material attempts in Chinese society to affect 
egalitarian relationships at the site of production. Some major examples, like the Great Leap 
Forward, lie outside the time period of this investigation, but re-contextualizing them as 
reactions to the class stratification that the first Five Year Plan wrought reveals the centrality of 
this contradiction. And, the excesses of Maoist mass campaigns set specifically to rectify these 
class creations show that merely introducing mass participation into the productive installation of 
socialism does not easily resolve the problems implied by pursuing modernization along Soviet 
lines. Rather these mass campaigns set the problematic vocabulary through which these class 
formations were to be articulated as not fundamentally contradictory to Communism rather than 
adequately resolving them. Take for instance the practice of labeling powerful cadres as covert 
capitalist roaders. Rather than theorizing a solution to unequal power the naturally followed from 
cadre’s authority to organize and command those below (a role necessary in coordinating 
industrial production), this labeling deems the disparity in power a facet of individual impurity. 
This notion of individual impurity was central to the Beijing Department Store, but first it is 
important to explain the material dimension of the societal contradiction in more detail. 
 
Cai locates tensions like the one above (between faithful proletarians and capitalist roaders) as 
outcomes of material contradictions rather than discursive formations; i.e. it was not that the 
abstract category of “cadre” had some internal inconsistency; cadres really had an unequal 
amount of power over production at odds with the notion of complete egalitarianism.90 While 
these categories like “model worker” and “capitalist roader” were identities internal to socialism 
 




(as productive installation), they became contradictory in the midst of these material tensions 
within production (and consumption). For Cai the, productive capacity engendered by the Five 
Year Plans was accomplished by modernist means of division of labor. Recall Karl’s explanation 
of the First Five Year Plan: “in 1953, the CCP opted for the Soviet path of development. This 
called for modernization based on maximum extraction of surplus from rural areas to fund heavy 
industrialization located in the cities.”91 As we noted, this presented a contradiction with the 
CCP’s formulation of town and countryside (the subject of chapter one). Furthermore, however, 
it represented a crisis on the level of distribution, which was not decided democratically but was 
instead decided by party fiat based on maximum extraction of labor power and “arbitrary” (to 
use Pollock’s words) reinvestment of surplus into construction.92 This surplus was largely 
applied to the construction of more industry, a fact which only deepened the unresolved 
repressiveness of workplace relations (recall the party’s slogan from chapter one in reference to 
the sequestering of worker residences at the outside of cities to make room for more factories: 
“production first, life second”). Cai separates this crisis in distribution, which “exposed conflicts 
between different social levels,” from crises in consumption, which “in contrast, gave rise to the 
notion of the individual.”93 However, as Pollock notes, “production and producers’ consumption 
are two aspects of the same process.”94 And in the Beijing Department Store, where service 
laborers like Zhang Binggui were subjected to this drive for maximum extraction, we see this 
unity. However, this connection between production and consumption, as we will see, means that 
in the context of modernization, the trial by fire of Communism is not easily put off for a later 
stage of socialism. 
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For Cai, the drive for surplus extraction through rationalized labor created alienation, a problem 
that was never contended with explicitly.95 In fact, we can see how the structure of the 
Department Store, much like the arcades, intervenes to obscure this alienation. Not only was a 
new temporality introduced by the variety and newness of the commodities on display, but the 
inclusion of rest areas and day-cares obscured the inhospitably of the city to actual workers (who 
when shopping were provided a place at odds with their actual relegation to the urban periphery) 
and thus rearticulated the labor both inside and outside the Department Store and presented it as 
operating under a non-repressive, inclusionary logic. Indeed, the Beijing Department Store was 
meant to be a site visited by workers, farmers, and soldiers throughout the country, as a symbol 
of a new utopia with their desires at the center.96 
 
However, the abundance presented by the Department Store’s commodities, despite addressing 
some residue of the problem of alienation, was itself met with anxiety by a socialism defined as 
equally by rugged asceticism as it was mass participation in political action.97 This anxiety was 
expressed by socialists at the time who assumed that abundance would “undermine people’s faith 
in communism.”98 With Mao himself calling this potential abundance a “sugarcoated bullet.”99 
However, Cai, like Rodchenko and Arvatov, questions “why material things would necessarily 
undermine people’s faith in communism…”100  Ultimately, because of this unresolved tension 
 
95 Cai, 419. 
96 “Beijing’s Newly Constructed Department Store,” People’s Daily; Zhang, 92-93. 
97 Karl, Mao Zedong, 53 for earlier origins of Maoist asceticism in the Yan’an years before 1949. This ties into the 
contradiction Cai poses between the CCP’s imperatives as an insurgent party and its position as a government body 
post-1949. 
98 Cai, 364. 
99 Karl, Mao Zedong, 86. 




between a modern mode of production and Maoism’s Mass Line and rural focus, the commodity 
took on the form of a contradiction. Production was for the good of the nation, and consumption 
was potentially reactionary. Yet, as Pollock explained, production, consumption, and distribution 
are all sides of the same problematic, and the drive for mass production necessitated mass 
consumption both to give a sense that the economy provides for the populace (Buck Morss’s 
“utopics of sensuality”) as well to generate surplus through sales that could be reinvested in 
socialist construction. This is what the Department Store represents: a contradictory necessity. 
The Department Store materialized this contradiction as an empirical fact of the urban 
environment. By questioning why the commodity was viewed with such circumspection, Cai 
implicitly sees this contradiction as avoidable, and indeed, as we have seen, there are utopian 
potentials in the socialist object. What Cai does not see is that the fear commodity was not an ill-
conceived asceticism nor the result of Mao’s personal rugged ethic; rather, as Benjamin noted 
“an astute party stratagem is involved.”101 Therefore we can read the contradiction between 
proliferation of commodities and the regime’s condemnation of commodities through the lens of 
the trial by fire. Doing so highlights the need to bring out the potential of the object as more than 
just a missed opportunity, but essential to weathering this defining conjuncture in socialism. 
What I mean is that the Maoist state can be read as a project that failed Benjamin’s trial by fire, 
providing a sphere of urban consumer relations without bringing out a specifically socialist 
relationality of the object—but also a project that, in an indirect way, realized it had failed and 
attempted to eliminate the traces of that consumer sphere—however in failing to recognize that 
sphere’s emancipatory potential, erased that potential alongside society’s real and imagined 
bourgeois forces. 
 




The Urban Contradiction  
In explaining the Department Store as not just a manifestation of these contradictions but also as 
an example of the limited solutions presented internally to remedy them (that is, a realization of 
the trial), an undertheorized section of Cai is a useful starting point. Cai locates one dimension of 
the modernity/egalitarianism contradiction specifically in the urban situation. He explains that 
the Maoist state emphasized the “important function of political parties in the life of the masses 
who have existed outside political life….” That is, the Party stood in as a representative for those 
left out of political life under the previous regimes, in this case the peasants. This formulation 
arose from the party’s inception as an insurgent power vying for state control. After the 
Revolution, wherein the party took on the power of the state, this representation became 
contradictory. ‘Peasant’ became a conceptual identity whose supposed will legitimized the power 
of the Party. Other actors, who did not necessarily exist prior the party’s ascendance (or at least 
not to the degree that they came to) and thus owed their existence to the Party’s modernization 
drives (such as the urban dweller) were nonetheless considered outside the Party’s constituent 
pool and are thus conceptualized a threat to the society. For Cai, this is a narrative function, but 
he shows that it has real material origins. Specifically, he explains how the form of the city 
alongside industrial production engendered a set of subjectivities and desires. He argues that:  
 
“when society produces the city as a materialized form of space,  it simultaneously 
produces forms of expression about people’s desire for such space…socialism as a 
modern social form not only produces its working time, but it also produces its leisure 
time…Desire and its various cultural expressions, such as aesthetics, emotional life, and 
taste, are all related to leisure time.”102 
 
 




Cai calls this nexus of desires and forms of expression the “individual lifeworld,” and he 
connects it directly to the everyday experiences of urban space.103 Thus, while much of the anti-
urban inclinations in Maoism stemmed from Mao’s fear of a new bourgeoisie arising within the 
Party ranks, the introduction of this concept of the urban everyday life shows that the crisis in 
socialism was more complex. Indeed, Mao’s anti-bureaucratic streak does not totally rectify the 
fact that his and other CCP policies created urbanization and attached to it the highest goal of 
socialism. This gets back to the contradictory nature of Mao’s urban theory in chapter one.  
 
In other words, under Maoist theory, these left out masses (the peasants) are excluded by the 
landlords and the urban comprador class. However, this latter class was peculiar under socialism 
(i.e. as a given, productive installation). With the exodus of foreign powers during the Japanese 
occupation and routing of the GMD during the Civil War, those urban capitalists with liquid 
assets left altogether or fled to Taiwan.104 Those filling urban centers after 1949 did so only by 
virtue of the Communist modernization push, rather than against it. Thus, here we can see an 
entryway for the “European correlation of money and power” into the socialist system: the Party 
created an urban environment dotted with department stores, thus engendering a group whose 
subjectivity is defined in part by that experience. This goes deeper than Cai’s comment on leisure 
time. As Rodchenko depicted vis-à-vis his wariness of GUM, if the commodity is not centered in 
the society as a way to link up individual desires to social goals, it is liable to constitute only 
individuals, as indeed the experience of buying consumer commodities is a singular experience 
(you buy a shirt based on how it would fit you, an individual, and in so doing you construe your 
individuality with the image of the shirt. Eventually you exist via the totality of your 
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possessions—like the man in Rodchenko’s GUM ad). But this correlation bumped up against the 
other side of the PRC defined by the proletarian masses. This group of urban individuals was 
colored by the philosophy, foundational to the PRC, which painted them as parasitic consumers. 
In essence, the urban collective was not the traditionally left-out category that socialism sought 
to represent, despite existing by virtue of socialism. Here we see the dimensions of the trial by 
fire of Chinese Maoism. Unlike the Soviet project which was always centered on the urban 
masses, the PRC maintained these masses at a distance. In light of this, the penetration of the 
“European correlation” does not mean the immediate defeat of Communism, but rather the 
beginning of an enduring contradiction. This incommensurability of the urban lifeworld with the 
peasant-proletarian national subject created a crisis that the Maoist understanding of social 
relations could not contend with, and thus this incommensurability was ultimately leveled at the 
individual rather than the society. 
 
The Limitless Proletariat 
Focusing on the individual lifeworld as a result of the material interventions of the CCP allows 
us to bridge the gap between Cai’s analysis of socialist crisis and our investigation of the 
Department Store, as this ‘lifeworld,’ or nexus of subjectivities and relations articulated by 
construction, was exactly what we illuminated in our reading of the Arcades Project. We then 
are able to read the Department Store as both those material conditions that engender this 
lifeworld, but also as a physical intervention meant to address the contradiction this lifeworld 
represented. This latter idea, of political intervention as an attempted resolution to the crisis, 
comes from Cai’s account of the Cultural Revolution and other mass campaigns of the 1960s. 




level of space. Indeed, just as the contradiction existed earlier then the 1960s, the logics at play 
in these mass campaigns existed in the Department Store.  
 
The central logic that Cai describes is “internalization,” or the process whereby the class 
differentiations engendered by the Five Year Plan were re-articulated as divisions internal to the 
proletariat. Essentially, to justify the CCPs role as a Communist party heralding new egalitarian 
relations of production, the repressive relations of production that came from seeking Soviet-
style modernization had to be disentangled from the very notion of class qua a relationship of 
production. Instead the concept, “proletariat,” largely freed from any material referent, 
encapsulated all people, so that any interclass problems or tensions were rendered as 
intraproletarian problems. Furthermore, within the logic of Marxism, the seizure of the means of 
production by revolutionary relations of production (the Communist party), meant that industry 
was no longer objectified or seen as external to the proletarian subject. For Cai, this articulation 
comes from the collision of modernization ideals and the “Marxism-informed political attitude of 
the proletarian being the master of the country.”105 Citing a national directive published the same 
year as the opening of the Beijing Department Store, Cai explains that the party attempted to 
inscribe construction as an internal component of worker discipline. For Cai, this explains the 
labeling of social ills as the problem of “bourgeois thoughts,” etc.106 As the concept ‘proletarian’ 
expanded to encapsulate everything, anything it could not subsume (what he calls a “remainder,” 
such as the individual lifeworld) was rearticulated as an internal flaw.107 An examples of this is 
the Cultural Revolution’s attempts to root out secret reactionaries hiding inside the proletariat 
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and the practice of demanding self-critique—forcing the individual to admit to holding bad 
beliefs rather than understanding the relationships and logics (i.e. the contradictions) that 
threatened the Party’s emancipatory vision.  
 
We can see this logic at play vis-à-vis the urban lifeworld. The proletariat came to preside over 
the control of urban space, but the “proletariat,” as a disembodied concept, signified not a 
material relationality but rather an ideological content defined by rationalized and intensive 
labor, as well as a general asceticism and peasant character. Thus the city, wherein the 
production of commodities and construction of large architectural projects were sought after to 
present a kind of utopia of development, created desires incommensurate with this ideological 
content. Problems of urban everyday life were thus re-imaged as personal failings, such as 
bourgeois corruption heralded by commodities as sugar coated bullets. If we read this back 
against our discussion of the commodity form, we see this internalization as the Party’s solution 
to the trial by fire of communism. By re-articulating Arvatov’s social harmony as the expansion 
of the proletariat through time rather than the spatial reconfiguration of the working class vis-à-
vis the socialist object, the Party could articulate the correlation of money and power that 
penetrated the Department Store as external to the PRC. In essence, this correlation had not 
penetrated society at all, rather capitalist individuals had penetrated society. Weathering the trial 
by fire was thus equated to rooting out these individuals. Ultimately, the Cultural Revolution 
sought to solve this remainder by rooting it out violently. This violence touched the Beijing 
Department Store via struggle sessions and criticisms of the salesclerk, Zhang Binggui.108 
 
108 Li Yuancheng 李元程, “Zhang Binggui: Laomo Yao Dang Xialai Jiu Dei Yi Beizi Shishi Zaizai Qugan” 张秉
贵：劳模要当下来就得一辈子实实在在去干 [Zhang Binggui: To Be a Model Workers Means to Work Hard for a 
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Returning to his account, we see how this logic of internalization overshadowed his analysis of 
social relations as rooted in the object and rearticulated the function of the Department Store 
away from an open-ended site of new modes of everyday life and into a repressive apparatus that 
flattened of all social relationships under the single word categories “worker-farmer-soldier” and 
“customer.”  
 
Sell for the Revolution 
In 1977, less than one year after Mao’s death and during the party’s reassessment (and ultimate 
condemnation) of the Cultural Revolution, Zhang Binggui reasserted the logic of the first Five 
Year Plan. In the piece titled, “Sell for the Revolution” (literally: for the revolution, stand behind 
the shop counter, wei geming zhan guitai), Zhang asserts that construction, more than a mere 
necessity, is in fact the ultimate goal of socialism. He positions the department store as the 
necessary fulfiller of consumer needs in order to maintain socialist production.  
 
Echoing both Cai’s assertion that the question of alienation arose from this production and our 
Benjaminian critique of linear temporality’s tendency to reduce proletarian involvement in 
politics to merely laboring, Zhang asks, “how can us salespersons contribute to the revolution? 
We can save workers, farmers, and peasants time so that they can better participate in the 
construction of socialism.”109 Indeed, Zhang’s overall assessment of socialism doubles down on 
the productivist logic of the early Mao years. Speaking of the Cultural Revolution, Zhang argues 
“there arose an evil force, arguing that ‘to intensively pursue technology is to go down the white 
road [a reference to the Maoist critique of economism],” but, argues, Zhang, “I do not believe 
 




this group.” True socialism for Zhang “is red and white.”110 But the red in Zhang’s socialism 
seems little more than the pursuit of progress under alienated conditions of labor. He asserts that 
with the intensive pursuit of technology “everything develops forward without limit. I sell goods 
more and more quickly, but I must never reach my goal, it too must always progress.” Here, 
time, viewed linearly, is internalized in the proletariat, which actualizes its true subjectivity by 
working. Those who assert direct mass involvement are de-proletarianized as evil forces who 
merely stall the inevitable march of progress. 
 
Cleary, Zhang’s politics reflect a notion of socialism defined by production. It is important to 
note his social role, however, as it renders his theory more than just the belief of a private 
individual. As a model worker, Zhang was thrust onto the national stage in order to represent, in 
one personification, the desired social relations of the Department Store, and indeed the 
consumer side of the Five Year Plan—a side that, while posited as essential, is totally subsumed 
under the need for construction in his account. The role of the individual salesperson in this 
schema is to strive to achieve maximum productivity. Indeed, Zhang explains how he comported 
his mind in order to complete multiple tasks simultaneously, an account that equates the 
salesperson with a machine.111 Clearly, we see the way that a linear notion of time and faith in 
the evolution of productive forces articulated the politics and, ultimately the labor, inside the 
Department Store. Returning to the way that the physical structure of the store undergirds this 
articulation sheds light on its connection to the contradiction Cai identifies at the center of the 
Maoist project.  
 
 





In positioning progress as a subset of his and other workers’ labor speed, Zhang asserts progress 
as internal to the proletariat. This is relayed in statements like “with chairman Hua calling on us 
to go all out and learn from Daqing and Dazhai [model industrial and agricultural examples] how 
could I rest?” for if Zhang rests, those worker’s exemplary labor would be held back by his own 
unproductivity, thus stalling the entire project of historical progress.112 However, alongside this, 
his account of the salesperson-consumer interaction within the Department Store shows how the 
building was essential in upholding this temporality. Indeed, the formulation, “worker, farmer, 
soldier” as the main agent of socialist construction, who merely passes through the Department 
Store—either satisfied or unsatisfied, quickly or slowly—posits the reproduction of the socialist 
masses as a facet of mass labor.  “Worker farmer soldier” here is presented as the single word 
gongnongbing. This collapse plays into Cai’s account of internalization and alienation. Satisfied 
gongnongbing are the product of Zhang’s labor. The faster he can produce them, the faster they 
can produce socialist utopia. In this sense, not only consumption, but production, is internalized 
into the figure of Zhang. Salesperson, worker, farmer, soldier, urbanite, and rural peasant cease 
to be relational objects and instead become facets of Zhang: their ability to fulfill their role is 
dependent on Zhang’s ability to produce them. But furthermore, Zhang’s account shows how this 
ability is not understood in terms of input and output or production and distribution, but is 
instead understood as merely dependent on his productivity and fealty to the correct 
interpretation of Maoism. This is particularly evident in Zhang’s accounts of interactions with 
customers. In one instance Zhang recounts a female worker who got angry with him, only for 
him to discover that she was angry with her children. He then educated her on the correct 
instruction of children, and she thanked him for his ideological work.113 In another, Zhang 
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recounts customers who would not line up correctly. Instead of telling them to line up, Zhang 
served them while simultaneously tending to the others in line (all the while noting the 
customers’ specific origins and attributing their potential bad behavior to possible bad practice or 
even deficiencies in their diets brought on by migration to Beijing, to which Zhang provides 
them the correct products).114 Here the competing classes of peasant/urbanite, migrant/habitant, 
and soldier/civilian (and even their intersection with gender) find unity in the figure of the 
customer, whose ability to come into being as agent of socialist construction hinges solely on 
Zhang’s ability to hold correct beliefs and act on them (work at the fastest possible speed and 
recommend the correct products). This is to say nothing of the influence of the commodities 
themselves, which by being theorized as empty measures of Zhang’s productivity and theoretical 
purity, lose their potential to bring out possible egalitarian relations between salesperson, 
consumer, and the wider collective. If the socialist subject is all encompassing, then there is no 
socialist object. The complex interplay between the consumption and collective images of 
emancipation are lost, and instead as Arvatov feared, everyday life is “purely invaded and 
colonized by production.”115 
 
This sheds new meaning onto Cai’s critique of the lifeworld of the individual. These individual 
backgrounds and social relationality, by not being theorized in a new Communist way—that is a 
transcendent way—take on the form of capitalist difference: employee and customer, consumer 
and producer. Any negative impact of the commodity on experience of the worker and buyer is 
rationalized as faults of the individual. The existence of the trial by fire is rejected, and any 
positive potential of the commodity is also rendered invisible. The workers, who built the 
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Department Store, thus find their apotheosis as limitless subject within it, as it flattens all 
interpersonal and political relationships into the logic of transaction and alienated production. 
The logic of internalization that Cai identifies is not antithetical to the logic of capital, and thus 
makes sense of the existence of the department store, a capitalist form, as a residue within 
socialism—one parallel to the residue of linear modernity in socialism. This structure, by 
capturing the wish-images of abundance and the repressive wish-image of capitalist 
accumulation, internalizes the linear teleology of modernity and inscribes it into everyday life of 
the socialist city. This brings us back to the Department Store’s constructive principle. As the 
subconscious reflection of economic needs and their subjective and political solutions, the 
Department Store actualized a material space that obscured and perpetuated the class relations 
behind those needs and solutions. Returning to the image of the prism from chapter one, if time 
is the force that gets manipulated by the prism, we now see the character of that manipulation. 
The Department Store jettisoned the spatial-political origin of that linear time—global 
translations of communism, repressive politics of modernization, legitimate threat from 
international forces, physical urban construction—and refracted it through the individual, who 
while existing in fundamental contradiction with the society, was made single-handedly 
responsible for maintaining its trajectory through history. 
 
Conclusion  
The problems that Benjamin identified with social democrats, who through their adherence to 
linear temporality transformed social change into an “anteroom” are not merely problems of 
parliamentary politics. Indeed, Cai shows that revolution too is susceptible to this de-




contradictory set of exigencies from the maintenance of socialism as a productive installation, 
Cai shows how residues of modernity easily seep into attempts to formulate the future. The drive 
to construct the urban environment as a monument to new relations of production, despite 
denying the residues of capital, ended up following its blueprints. As Benjamin opined in the 
Arcades Project, “[t]hese architects design supports resembling Pompeian columns, and factories 
that imitate residential houses, just as later the first railroad stations will be modeled on chalets. 
Construction plays the role of the subconscious.”116 It is clear that modernity and its repressive 
history of urban renewal haunted the subconscious of the socialist productive installation, that is 
as a project of construction. From this we can see how the impulse to redesign Beijing even 
mirrored impulses like Haussmannization. Despite the CCP’s aims toward radically different 
social relations than Napoleon III, those similarities could not be exorcised by merely labeling 
consumption as proletarian. Indeed, it exacerbated them.  
 
In the Beijing Department Store we see the internalization of history and class conflict as subsets 
of the proletarian work ethic. In applying the ideology forged by an insurgent party under 
conditions of imperialist domination to the project of construction, the insurgent group expanded 
to cover the totality of the Chinese population. Those relationships engendered by this drive for 
production and construction (but not immediately understandable through the agrarian lens of 
that insurgent ideology) presented a burgeoning crisis for the CCP. The Department Store as a 
nexus both of consumption and production and as a nexus of the urban lifeworld and proletarian 
masses was the pillar that held up the entire Five Year Plan. 
 
 




However, just as the Maoist project had real utopian potentials, so did the Beijing Department 
Store. The capacity of objects to rearticulate everyday life as a complex unity of production and 
consumption existed at the interstices of Zhang’s shop counter. As Arvatov notes, the strict 
separation of production and consumption and the positing of everyday life as the polar opposite 
to social labor derives from the “class-technical differentiation that characterized the capitalist 
system, with its administrative top brass standing above production.”117 And indeed, Cai shows 
that this differentiation pervaded the PRC. But the material reality of the Department Store as a 
discrete physical structure whose constructive principle colored its salespersons and consumers 
as allies in a socialist project presented real potentials for not only tearing down the barrier 
between producer and consumer but also the barrier between everyday life and egalitarian 
political projects. Ultimately, the image of Zhang scurrying between the Department Store’s 
goods and the queue of clientele represents an attempt to tear down the shop counter qua that 
barrier. But in tearing out that counter without resituating the commodities resting on it, he left 
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CONCLUSION: THE FIRE IN THE BASEMENT 













Image 4.1: Statue of Zhang Binggui at the Entrance to the Beijing Department Store, Zhang Jingshu and Li Muyi, 




In her discussion of the Plaza Carlos III Department Store during Cuba’s “Special Period” of the 
1990s, the historian, Kathrine Gordy, examines the building as a dialectical image. In its halls, 
she sees how the socialist collective’s vision of political emancipation bumped up against the 
contradictory imperatives of party hegemony and “pragmatic” adoption of capitalist elements. 
She defines this contradictory Party articulation of the Department Store as “Sales + Economy + 
Efficiency = Revolution.”119 Returning to Zhang Binggui, we see that his account bears a similar 
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scheme. Zhang explains, Quantity, Speed, Quality, and Economy = “Socialist Momentum” 
(Dagan Shehuizhuyi de Jintou, literally the strength of energetic/all out socialism)120 This 
parallelism shows that the Beijing Department Store, despite manufacturing its own goods for 
the specifically Chinese Economy, was more than just a Chinese structure. It was a socialist 
building whose contradictions had global implications. An analysis that puts GUM, The Beijing 
Department Store, and the Plaza Carlos III together in one constellation show that these 
consumer sites were not singular creations of distinct political projects, but were rather endemic 
of Communist efforts in the twentieth century. The mass production that made Marxist analysis 
possible also made the realization of Communism possible. But this realization would be no 
simple feat. Looking at these structures and the urban plans behind them bolsters the notion that 
Benjamin’s “trial by fire” represented a defining moment of Communism. In the PRC, the 
introduction of commodities into Beijing’s urban space arose from competing imperatives of 
modernization and egalitarianism. While the Department Store’s origin in a teleological 
modernization campaign limited its potential to rearticulate social relationships in a new way, 
this did not stop individuals like Zhang (and his soviet compatriots like Rodchenko) from hoping 
for more from the socialist object. In China this hope and its teleological underpinning came into 
contact with official party strategy and Maoist mass politics and was eventually lost in Zhang’s 
own discourse of the proletarian work ethic. One quote from “Sell for the Revolution” articulates 
this struggle best: “With Mao Zedong theory in my mind, a fire is kindled in my heart.” While 
Zhang intends for this “fire” to signify productivity, it unwittingly touches on the historical 
forces bearing down on the Beijing Department Store as Chinese Communism’s trial by fire.   
 
 




When I first visited the Beijing Department Store in 2018, my experience was not one of 
contradiction. At the center of Beijing’s premier shopping street, the Department Store seemed 
less a residue of the socialist moment, and more a marginally socialist themed architectural 
object that nonetheless offered typical global commodities—a kind of Maoist Disneyland. 
Stumbling through a crowd of tourists, and in search of a place to buy sunscreen with my 
American credit card, I almost missed the bust of Zhang Binggui at the entrance, a bust 
inscribed: “A Spirit of Fire Shines in China” (Image 4.1).121  
 
In 1978, Zhang Binggui was awarded the title “Special Salesman” (teji shouhouyaun) by Mao’s 
Successor, a title at odds with and yet less contradictory than his previous title of “Model 
Worker.”122 Indeed, the premium placed on construction in “Sell for the Revolution,” is in no 
small measure due to that moment, a moment in which a new logic of stability and economic 
production was once again taking root in the PRC. While the 1970s and 80s were in no way a 
closed horizon, the eventual shift to production above all, a shift which eventually shed the 
ideological baggage of the Mass Line to reveal only global capital, invites us to remember that 
these contradictions were not merely paradoxes in party discourses—they represented real 
material dilemmas and real political visions. While the inscription on the statue of Zhang 
certainly valorizes the contemporary penetration of the “European correlation of money with 
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power” in China, that “spirit of fire” is also the spirit of the trial by fire, its contradictory nature 
and the enduring spatial significance of its attempted resolution. 
 
Despite the ultimate failure of Maoism in tackling the problems of urban everyday life and other 
relations engendered by the first Five Year Plan, the Maoist project of inciting mass participation 
to fundamentally alter repressive relationships, even under the supposed victory of socialism, 
was a real political horizon aware of the capitalist relations at the interstices of Beijing’s urban 
environment. Now, in a moment where those capitalist relations have achieved complete 
ascendance, the Mass Line represents a real primal history, one that can help us articulate 
something transcendent today.  
 
Opened in 1955, the Beijing Department arose out of contradictions in CCP planning:  
contradictions between town and country, between production and consumption, and between 
modernity and egalitarianism. It shows us that the task of building a new world must always face 
the residues of the very real catastrophe that is capitalist modernity. As the PRC and other post-
socialist projects continue to heap wreckage onto history, as those fragments of a primal past 
recede further and further into the distance, the task of resurrecting them becomes more 
important than ever. Exorcising those residues means no less than shifting the frame of reference 
(but not the criteria!)— searching the past for the real emancipatory moments of Maoism, but 
delinking them from the linear time of progress that violently proclaims them the pre-history of 
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